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THE TRANSFORMATIVE TWELFTH AMENDMENT
JOSHUA D. HAWLEY*
ABSTRACT
Scholars have long treated the Twelfth Amendment as a constitu-
tional obscurity, a merely mechanical adjustment to the electoral
college—and perhaps a less than successful one at that. This con-
sensus is mistaken. In fact, the Twelfth Amendment accomplished
one of the most consequential changes to the structure of our
constitutional government yet. It fundamentally altered the nature
of the Executive and the Executive’s relationship to the other
branches of government. The Amendment changed the Executive into
something it had not been before: a political office. The presidency
designed at Philadelphia was intended to be neither a policymaking
nor a representative institution, but rather an apolitical office
standing above partisan conflict. The Twelfth Amendment changed
this design. It converted the electoral college into a form of public
election, facilitating organized political competition for the presi-
dency and linking the office to popular majorities. This revision of
the electoral college had twin structural effects. First, the Amend-
ment unified the executive branch under the political control of the
President and made single-party control of the Executive a near
certainty. Second, the Amendment changed the Executive’s relation-
ship to Congress by conferring on the President new warrants for
political action and a representative status it had not previously
enjoyed. Together, these structural changes altered the very nature of
the Executive—and along with it, the meaning of “executive power.”
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This Article concludes with a close analysis of the Amendment’s
interpretive implications for contested questions of executive power,
including the President’s power to remove subordinates, to conclude
treaties and executive agreements, and to exercise directive authority
over administrative agencies. 
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“The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot
for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be
an inhabitant of the same state with themselves; they shall name in
their ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots
the person voted for as Vice-President, and they shall make distinct
lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for
as Vice-President and of the number of votes for each.... The person
having the greatest Number of votes for President, shall be President,
if such number a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed;
and if no person have such a majority, then from the persons having
the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for
as President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately,
by ballot, the President.”
—U.S. Constitution, Amendment XII (1804).
INTRODUCTION
It is time the Twelfth Amendment got its due. For years, the
Amendment has been regarded as a constitutional nonentity—a
piece of textual fiddling not worth remembering or one that, if it
bears any significance at all, serves only to illustrate the irredeem-
able absurdity of the electoral college.1 Legal scholars have all but
ignored the text; historians, similarly, have given it little attention.2
1. Typical of this view is Steven G. Calabresi, The President, the Supreme Court, and the
Founding Fathers: A Reply to Professor Ackerman, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 475-76 (2006).
Calabresi concludes the Twelfth Amendment “made one small technical change in the
Founders’ machinery of government” that had little practical effect. See id. On this point at
least, Bruce Ackerman and Calabresi agree. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE
FOUNDING FATHERS: JEFFERSON, MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 247
(2005) (arguing that the Twelfth Amendment “is the very opposite of a serious attempt” to
solve the problems posed by the crisis of 1800). Others have called the Twelfth Amendment
a “constitutional stupidity.” See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, An Accident Waiting to Happen, in
CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES 15, 15-17 (William N. Eskridge,
Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998); see also SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA’S FIFTY-
ONE CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE 178-90 (2012). When they have bothered
to pay attention to the Amendment at all, scholars and commentators have generally
neglected to investigate what the Amendment’s drafters were attempting to do, thereby
missing the Amendment’s true significance. See, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN
CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANS 1801-1829, at 40-41, 64 (2001); GARRY WILLS, “NEGRO
PRESIDENT”: JEFFERSON AND THE SLAVE POWER 106-13 (2003). 
2. Although there have been over 1,200 articles published in academic legal journals
analyzing the electoral college in the context of the disputed 2000 presidential election,
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The conclusion that the Amendment is inconsequential is prevalent
and well-established. It is also wrong. Contrary to decades’ worth of
conventional wisdom, the Twelfth Amendment is in fact a trans-
formative constitutional text that fundamentally altered the
structure of American government by altering the character of the
presidency and its relationship to the government’s other branches.
Indeed, the Twelfth Amendment is in many senses responsible for
Journal and Article Search for Presidential Election, WESTLAW NEXT, http://westlawnext.com
(searching for “2000 presidential election” and “electoral college”), only two full-length law
review articles have addressed themselves to the Twelfth Amendment. The first is Sanford
Levinson & Ernest A. Young, Who’s Afraid of the Twelfth Amendment?, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
925, 925-26 (2001). That article is far more interested in Bush v. Gore than in the Amendment
itself, however. See id. at 955-56. More recently, David Fontana has noticed the Twelfth
Amendment’s significance for the modern separation of powers. See David Fontana, The
Second American Revolution in the Separation of Powers, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1409 (2009).
Fontana is principally interested in the political homogeneity the Twelfth Amendment helped
introduce to the executive branch, in contrast to the heterogeneity typical in many European
governments and other “presidentialist” systems. Id. at 1409-10, 1418. This is an important
insight. Fontana does not notice, however, that the political homogeneity the Twelfth
Amendment helped produce is in fact only one element of the broader structural trans-
formation the text achieved—namely, the conversion of the presidency into a political office.
See id. at 1429 (explaining that his conclusion focuses solely on the homogeneity of executive
power). Nor does Fontana show any interest in the significance of the Amendment for the
meaning and practice of executive power. Id. One scholar who has recognized the connection
between the Twelfth Amendment and presidential practice is the political scientist Jeremy
Bailey. See JEREMY D. BAILEY, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND EXECUTIVE POWER 195-224 (2007).
But Bailey again misses the structural changes the Twelfth Amendment implemented and
its central role in the rise of the political presidency. See id. at 220-24 (explaining his research
in terms of the politics of character). The Amendment has received some limited scholarly
attention in book form. Tadahisa Kuroda has written an admirable account of the
Amendment’s ratification. See generally TADAHISA KURODA, THE ORIGINS OF THE TWELFTH
AMENDMENT: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1787-1804 (1994) (examining
the inception and history of the electoral college). Lolabel House made an early effort at
exploring the Amendment’s constitutional implications, particularly as they concern political
parties. See generally Lolabel House, A Study of the Twelfth Amendment of the Constitution
of the United States (1901) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania) (on
file with University of Michigan). More recently, Akhil Amar has recognized that the Twelfth
Amendment “worked rather large changes in the basic structure of the American presidency
and its relation to other parts of the American constitutional order.” AKHIL REED AMAR,
AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 342 (2005). Amar is mostly interested, however, in
the political influence the Amendment conferred on slave states. See id. at 345-47. For his
part, Bruce Ackerman understands that the election of 1800 marked a seminal moment in the
development of the American presidency, see ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 142-62, but gives
virtually no attention, and assigns no significance, to the Twelfth Amendment. In short, the
Amendment awaits a full-scale analysis of its meaning, its effects, and its radical import.
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the modern separation of powers and the presidency as we know it
today.
The Twelfth Amendment changed the presidency by making it
into something it had not been before: a political office. This change
in the basic character of the Executive is a fact long overlooked by
legal scholars, but one which has major import not only for the
functioning of the constitutional system, but also for the meaning of
the “executive power” referenced in Article II, Section 1,3 as well as
the other, enumerated powers of Sections 2 and 3.4 The Executive
designed at Philadelphia was an utterly original invention, so much
that the Framers reached little consensus among themselves on how
precisely it would operate.5 What they did agree on was that the
President was not to be a political actor.6 In the Framers’ scheme,
Congress was the branch that represented the people and the
branch that made policy; it was Congress that stood at the center of
the Madisonian plan to “refine and enlarge” popular opinion into a
truly public-spirited national will.7 
By contrast, the original Constitution cast the Executive as a
check on congressional excess and as an enforcer of congressional
laws.8 Under the direction of a single President, the executive
department would supply “energy” to law enforcement and enable
the national government to meet emergencies with dispatch.9 But
beyond devising rules for consistent law administration, the
President was not to advance policy on his10 own.11 No Framer
imagined the President as the proponent of a legislative agenda,
still less as the advocate of a particular political philosophy or
spokesperson for political faction.12 And the Framers certainly did
3. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
4. U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 2-3.
5. See, e.g., James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 1, 1787),
reprinted in 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 64, 65-67 (Max Farrand
ed., 1937).
6. See infra Part I.A-B.
7. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 133-34 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed.,
1961). 
8. See infra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
9. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 5, at 64, 65-67. 
10. I use the male pronoun generically here and elsewhere when referring to the
Executive. 
11. See, e.g., infra notes 152-57 and accompanying text. 
12. See, e.g., infra notes 152-57 and accompanying text.
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not envision presidential election as the signal political event of the
national republic, organizing the country’s politics and driving its
political debate.13 
All those things happened after Philadelphia, and all of them
were made lasting by the Twelfth Amendment. The text altered
constitutional structure in critical ways. By instructing electors to
designate which of their ballots was cast for President, and which
for Vice-President, the Amendment facilitated organized electoral
competition for the presidency, connecting the office to popular
majorities in a way it had not been before.14 As it made the
presidency more majoritarian, this change in balloting eroded the
independence of the Vice-President and denigrated that office’s
political significance, rendering the executive branch at once more
politically homogeneous and more politically unified under presi-
dential control.15 Coupled with further changes that reduced the
number of candidates referred to the House of Representatives in
the event of a disputed election, the total effect of the Amendment
was to make the presidency a more truly representative and more
populist political institution.16 And this internal change in the
Executive’s character worked an external shift in the Executive’s
structural relationship to the other branches. The presidency’s new
connection with the public conferred on the office new warrants for
exerting political leadership and also conveyed new incentives to act
and lead, as well.17 After the Twelfth Amendment, the presidency
would become and remain an active, co-equally political branch. 
This mostly forgotten history has potentially broad implications
for the meaning of the President’s executive power and for his place
in the Constitution’s scheme of separated powers. This is because
the content of executive authority is perhaps uniquely determined
by constitutional structure. The text of Article II provides notori-
ously little guidance as to what executive power really consists of.
Section 1’s reference to “the executive power” leaves that term
undefined,18 and the list of discrete authorities conferred on the
13. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 7, at 373-74  (Alexander Hamilton).
14. See infra Part IV.C.1.
15. See infra Part III.A.2.
16. See infra Part III.A.1.
17. See infra Part III.B.2.
18. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
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President in Sections 2 and 3 is terse, if not Delphic, and susceptible
to widely divergent interpretations.19 Justice Robert Jackson
famously observed sixty years ago that “[j]ust what our forefathers
did envision, or would have envisioned had they foreseen modern
conditions, must be divined from materials almost as enigmatic as
the dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret for Pharaoh.”20 
And indeed, the powers and responsibilities outlined in Article II
may mean quite different things depending on the character of the
office to which they belong. The President’s power to recommend to
Congress “such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedi-
ent,”21 for instance, or to appoint officers of the United States22 or to
negotiate treaties,23 appear in one light if exercised by an apolitical
officer whose principal function is to facilitate congressional
government, and in quite another if deployed by an elected repre-
sentative of the people with authority to make policy and engage in
political dispute. 
By transforming the presidency from an apolitical office into a
robustly political one, the Twelfth Amendment transformed the
constitutional order. In the Parts that follow, I propose to examine
this structural shift and its consequences. I begin in Part I with a
fresh analysis of the Executive that the Framers actually designed,
finding it to be notably different from the one legal scholars all too
frequently presume them to have intended. When we set aside
modernist assumptions about presidential power and resist the urge
to read later constitutional developments back into the text, we
discover that the Framers’ Executive was an institution insulated
from, rather than connected to, the people. In Part II, I trace the
discovery in the 1790s of the presidency’s political potential, a
discovery that proved so disruptive that it threatened a constitu-
tional crisis. That crisis led ultimately to a new conception of the
presidency, developed by the Republicans and articulated by their
19. Sections 2 and 3 confer eight or possibly nine specific powers on the Executive,
depending on whether one reads Section 3’s “he shall receive Ambassadors and other public
Ministers” as a power or a duty. U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 2-3. 
20. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring). 
21. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
22. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
23. Id.
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leader, Thomas Jefferson. And it inspired a constitutional renova-
tion in the form of the Twelfth Amendment. In Part III, I turn to the
Amendment itself, describing its path through Congress and the
structural change its drafters intended it to accomplish. I conclude
this Part with a close analysis of the Amendment’s structural effects
and their consequences. 
Having thoroughly analyzed the Amendment’s text, history, and
structural significance, I turn in Part IV to examine the Amend-
ment’s possible legal consequences by reference to one particularly
enduring question of presidential power, the President’s authority
to remove executive officials without congressional approval.24 The
removal debate is of course longstanding, stretching back to the
First Congress.25 It remains an open—and fiercely contest-
ed—question today. It is in some sense the paradigmatic question
of executive power, implicating the meaning of the Article II Vesting
Clause;26 the enumerated executive powers of Article II, Sections 2
and 3; and Congress’s Article I authority to structure the executive
branch.27 
The removal debate is also at a standstill, thanks largely to the
ambivalence of the 1787 text and its associated history.28 In this
sense, the removal debate represents in microcosm the signature
difficulties in interpreting executive power. Structural reasoning on
the basis of the Twelfth Amendment has the potential to break the
logjam. And this is only one possible application of the story of the
Twelfth Amendment. I conclude Part IV by looking briefly at two
other applications, the President’s treaty power and his directive
authority over administrative agencies. No doubt still more could be
named. For whatever the precise application, the core point is this:
to understand America’s constitutional presidency, one must
understand the Twelfth Amendment. 
24. See infra Part IV.B.
25. See infra notes 475-83 and accompanying text.
26. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
28. See infra Part IV. 
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I. BEFORE THE REVOLUTION: THE PHILADELPHIA PRESIDENCY
It is an oft-told story how the delegates came to Philadelphia in
the summer of 1787 to save the fledgling republic. I propose to
revisit Philadelphia once more, but for a limited purpose—to notice
two features of the Framers’ constitutional scheme that are often
overlooked but are in fact critical for understanding their broader
project and the Executive they crafted for it. First, the fact that the
Framers’ program for positive government centered on Congress,
and second, that this government featured an apolitical President. 
To anticipate: The Philadelphia delegates envisioned Congress as
the branch to represent the people, to set national policy, and to be
the center of constitutional politics.29 On the other hand, the
Framers saw the President primarily as an officer whose purpose in
the federal order was to facilitate government by legislature.30 The
President would do this by balancing the legislative branch with his
veto, as well as his appointment and treaty powers, and by provid-
ing a steady execution of Congress’s laws.31 What the Framers did
not imagine was that the President would function as a political
actor.32 And thus while they conferred on the office significant
administrative powers, they withheld full control over the adminis-
tration and failed to spell out the reach or meaning of his executive
authority. 
This Part begins by examining the essentially Madisonian plan
for constitutional reform that animated the delegates’ work in 1787,
a vision of deliberative majority rule centered on Congress. Bringing
that project to the foreground will allow us then to turn to, and
better understand, the delegates’ construction of their apolitical
Executive. The lesson of these labors is this: contrary to what
advocates of the so-called “unitary executive” have often claimed,
the Framers did not design the presidency to stand at the apex of
the constitutional order.33 Theirs was a more modest, and more
29. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 7, (James Madison).
30. See infra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
31. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 7, (James Madison).
32. See, e.g., infra notes 152-57 and accompanying text.
33. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 1, at 479-82. 
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deeply ambiguous office.34 Yet, contrary to what others have argued,
that ambiguity is best explained not by the Framers’ division of
executive power into “political” and “administrative” spheres,35 still
less by any intention to leave Article II’s opacities to be resolved by
George Washington,36 but rather from the fact that the presidency’s
creators failed to imagine the institution for what it would shortly
become: a political animal.
A. Mr. Madison’s Project
The Framers intended their new constitutional government to be
a government by legislature, with the presidency cast in a support-
ing role.37 It was James Madison who supplied the Philadelphia
Convention’s reform agenda and the intellectual ballast to support
it. Madison’s major aim was to convert the loose-knit confederal
government of the Articles into a fully integrated national republic
capable of protecting citizens’ rights and producing sound policy.38
That meant reforming the legislature, first and foremost. “In a
republican government, the legislative authority, necessarily,
predominates,” Madison explained in Federalist No. 51.39 Yet
Madison and his allies at Philadelphia knew that government by
legislature posed certain acute difficulties.40 Their experience with
the state legislatures in the decade after independence convinced
them that legislatures were susceptible to capture by organized
interests bent on enacting narrow parochial agendas—the famous
34. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 68 (Alexander Hamilton).
35. Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 38-39 (1994). 
36. This is the claim of Akhil Amar in his recent book, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN
CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY (2012). Amar makes this
(mistaken) claim the centerpiece of his interpretation of Article II. See id. at 307-32. 
37. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 7, at 373-74 (Alexander Hamilton).
38. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 55-56 (1996); see also GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 471-74 (1969). 
39. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 7, at 355  (James Madison).
40. 9 JAMES MADISON, Vices of the Political System of the United States, in THE PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON 352-57 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1975); RAKOVE, supra note 38, at 52-
53; M. J. C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 143-145 (1967); WOOD,
supra note 38, at 194-96.
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problem of faction.41 “True it is,” Madison reflected in 1785, “that no
other rule exists, by which any question which may divide a Society,
can be ultimately determined, but the will of the majority; but it is
also true that the majority may trespass on the rights of the
minority.”42 The challenge was to construct a national government
that avoided the diseases of majority faction but still reflected the
majority will.43
Madison’s solution is familiar and justly celebrated. For our
purposes, the critical point to note is the degree to which that
solution centered on the legislature. In the now canonical Federalist
No. 10, Madison explained that republics, as he defined them, had
two principal advantages over democracies.44 First, they delegated
political decision making to representative bodies.45 Thus freed from
the need for citizens to meet and decide political matters in person,
republics were able, secondly, to embrace a “greater number of
citizens, and greater sphere of country.”46 Madison’s political science
joined these advantages together in the design of the national
legislature, as reflected in the final provisions of Article I.47 That
Article divided the new Congress into two houses.48 The lower house
was to be chosen by voters arranged in districts considerably larger
than those used to choose delegates to the state legislatures, for
Madisonian reasons: broadening the congressional electorate was
meant to prevent parochial factions from controlling congressional
elections.49 Senators were to be selected by state legislatures to
guarantee small states equal representation with larger ones, a
feature Madison did not support,50 but one that was nevertheless
susceptible to Madisonian justification: because the pool of senato-
rial candidates would encompass the entire state, Senators would
41. 9 MADISON, supra note 40, at 354-57. 
42. 8 JAMES MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments,
reprinted in THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 40, at 295-306.
43. See 9 MADISON, supra note 40, at 354-57.
44. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 7, at 133-34 (James Madison). 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. See, e.g., RAKOVE, supra note 38, at 46-56; VILE, supra note 40, at 153-54. 
48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
49. WOOD, supra note 38, at 499-506. 
50. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 5, at 37;
RAKOVE, supra note 38, at 170-71.
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be men of high reputation, accomplished, respected, and with any
luck, well-educated.51 
If it worked properly, this new Congress would reflect the people’s
preferences and shape them at the same time.52 Congress would
resist popular passions even as it obeyed the people’s interests,
elevating factional agendas and passing enthusiasms into a broad
and considered public will.53 It would be a government by majority
rule, but anti-majoritarian in character.54 It would be, in short, a
deliberative government.55 This was the Madisonian project. 
Yet Madison and his fellow delegates were mindful that popular
assemblies, however well-constructed, suffered from certain incur-
able defects. For one thing, they were congenitally unfit for law
enforcement. Madison had lamented the Articles’ lack of law-
enforcement authority before the Convention began.56 And the crisis
of Shay’s Rebellion troubled the minds of many delegates,57 who
concluded from the federal government’s inability to put down the
uprising in timely fashion that the new government needed “vigor
and dispatch” in law execution, as James Wilson put it.58 Then too,
all legislatures tended toward what Madison called “instability and
encroachments.”59 “The preservation of Republican Government,”
Madison concluded, “required some expedient,” some “effectual
check” for balancing the legislature as a whole and supplying its
defects.60 
For this, the Framers turned to an independent executive
branch separated from Congress and under the charge of a single
President.61 Proponents of the unitary Executive have been right to
see in this decision a fairly momentous break with colonial-era
51. See 9 MADISON, supra note 40, at 356-57. 
52. THE FEDERALIST NOS. 10, 51, supra note 7, (James Madison). 
53. 9 MADISON, supra note 40, at 357. 
54. See Willmoore Kendall, The Two Majorities, 4 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 317, 330-31 (1960). 
55. See RAKOVE, supra note 38, at 44-45. 
56. 9 MADISON, supra note 40, at 352. 
57. LEONARD D. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 13 (1959). 
58. 2 1787: DRAFTING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 1226 (Wilbourn E. Benton ed., 1986). The
phrase became a favorite of the delegates. See, e.g., id. at 1099 (quoting Edmund Randolph).
59. Id. at 1131. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 1115. 
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practice.62 But the Philadelphia presidency was always and ever the
servant of the Framers’ broader experiment in Congress-centered
deliberative government.63 They turned to an independent Executive
in order to make that government work. Indeed, even as they
created the presidency, the delegates held few firm convictions
about how precisely that presidency should operate. Madison
notoriously confessed to George Washington on the eve of the
Convention that he had not given the executive department much
thought.64 And really, this should come as no particular surprise. In
Madison’s political science, as in the text the Framers drafted, the
Executive was a secondary office. 
Perhaps the most promising clue to how the Framers understood
the Executive comes not in their debates about the content of
executive power, which were spare and few,65 but in the mode of
election they chose for the office. From that choice we learn the
following: the Executive the delegates fashioned to complete their
project in congressional government was not to be a political actor,
but rather an apolitical “Patriot King.”66 
B. Making a Patriot King
Before September, the Convention considered three primary
means of presidential election: by the national legislature (or a
subset of it); by the people (either directly or through electors the
people chose); or by one or more of the institutions of state govern-
ment.67 The most consistently popular method for the duration of
the Convention’s meeting was selection by Congress.68 This was the
62. See, e.g., STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE:
PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 31 (2008). 
63. Which is not to say that the Executive was the servant of Congress, per se. The
Framers were relatively clear on their desire to give the Executive independence from the
legislative branch. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 71, supra note 7, at 460 (Alexander Hamilton)
(“[I]t is certainly desirable that the Executive should be in a situation to dare to act his own
opinion with vigor and decision.”). 
64. 9 MADISON, supra note 40, at 385. 
65. RAKOVE, supra note 38, at 256-59 (demonstrating the Framers spent little time
debating the proper extent of executive power).
66. RALPH KETCHAM, PRESIDENTS ABOVE PARTY: THE FIRST AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, 1789-
1829, at 67 (1984).
67. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 5, at 68, 80-81.
68. See 2 1787: DRAFTING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, supra note 58, at 1095.
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approach proposed in the Virginia Plan69 and repeatedly favored in
floor votes.70 And it might have won the day, had John Rutledge and
the large states not attempted at the last minute to increase large-
state influence in presidential selection.71 That ill-timed maneuver
revived small state-large state hostilities and sent the Convention
into deadlock.72 The electoral college emerged only at the Conven-
tion’s end, as a compromise.73 Yet in all the to-and-fro over presiden-
tial election, perhaps the most striking thing is what the delegates
did not consider—the need to give the President democratic
legitimacy.74 Their presidency was not a representative institution. 
A firm majority of delegates believed that popular election by the
people was neither workable nor wise. James Wilson first moved to
select the Executive by direct vote of the public on June 2, 1787, just
four days after Edmund Randolph introduced the Virginia Plan and
two days before the delegates had conclusively settled on a single
rather than plural presidency.75 The motion failed seven states to
two.76 Wilson and his principal allies on the issue, Gouverneur
Morris and Daniel Carroll, would try again on four separate occa-
sions over the ensuing two and one-half months, each time falling
short.77 No more than six or seven delegates—from a pool of forty-
two—spoke positively of popular election during debate,78 and
political scientist William Riker estimates that no more than eleven
to at most seventeen delegates affirmatively supported public
election at any point.79 
69. See id. 
70. The Convention voted for legislative election no fewer than three times. William Riker
has carefully tabulated and analyzed every vote on the question, as well as the attendant
voting cycles. See William H. Riker, The Heresthetics of Constitution-Making: The Presidency
in 1787, with Comments on Determinism and Rational Choice, 78 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1 (1984). 
71. See id. at 12-13.
72. See id.
73. See id. at 13-14.
74. See generally id.
75. See 2 1787: DRAFTING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, supra note 58, at 1110. 
76. Id. at 1111. 
77. Wilson, Morris, or Carroll, or some combination thereof, moved for popular election
on June 2, July 17, and three times on August 24. For an analysis of the votes, see Riker,
supra note 70, at 6. 
78. Those delegates were Wilson, Morris, Madison, Carroll, Dickinson, Franklin, and
possibly King. See id. at 7. 
79. Id. 
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The reasons were various. Some delegates worried that permit-
ting the people to vote would invite demagoguery and inflame the
passions of faction. “A popular election in this case is radically
vicious,” Elbridge Gerry warned on July 25.80 “The ignorance of the
people would put it in the power of some one set of men dispersed
throughout the Union and acting in Concert to delude them into any
appointment.”81 Charles Pinckney raised the specter of the voting
public deceived “by a few active [and] designing men.”82 Hamilton
would later explain that the Convention found it “peculiarly
desirable to afford as little opportunity as possible to tumult and
disorder.”83 And Madison—who at one point favored popular election
at the Convention—nevertheless ultimately endorsed the alterna-
tive mode the delegates selected as likely to “render the choice more
judicious.”84
But on balance, the delegates worried more that the public simply
would not have sufficient information to judge the candidates for
office. Hugh Williamson of North Carolina claimed that “there was
the same difference between an election in this case, by the people
and by the legislature, as between an appointment by lot, and by
choice.”85 The people were too dispersed, over too many miles and
states, to know much of anything about candidates from states other
than their own. “There are at present distinguished characters, who
are known perhaps to almost every man,” Williamson said, thinking
of Washington, but “[t]his will not always be the case.”86 Most
delegates agreed.87 George Mason summed up the prevailing
thought when he remarked that “[t]he extent of the Country renders
80. 2 1787: DRAFTING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, supra note 58, at 1153. 
81. Id. 
82. James Madison, Notes of the Constitutional Convention (June 1, 1787), reprinted in
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 5, at 30. 
83. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 7, at 441 (Alexander Hamilton). 
84. 3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 518 (Phillip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). 
85. 2 1787: DRAFTING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, supra note 58, at 1128. 
86. Id. 
87. See, e.g., RAKOVE, supra note 38, at 259-60. Charles Pinckney offered a complementary
reason: the national legislature, having written the laws, would know far better than the
public what qualities were needed to enforce them. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 5, at 68 (“The National Legislature being most immediately
interested in the laws made by themselves, will be most attentive to the choice of a fit man
to carry them properly into execution.”).
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it impossible that the people can have the requisite capacity to judge
of the respective pretensions of the Candidates.”88 
These two arguments in combination proved decisive. Try as
Wilson and his allies might, they could not persuade the Convention
to embrace election by the populace.89 And this tells us something
quite important about the Philadelphia presidency—it was not an
office the delegates believed required democratic sanction in order
to be legitimate. Put another way, the role the delegates envisioned
for their Executive did not require political, majoritarian warrants
for action. Remarkably, not one delegate, not even the advocates of
direct election, appeared to worry that the failure to give the people
a vote would render the President impotent or presidential action
somehow illegitimate.90 Of the various claims Wilson and the pro-
election contingent pressed, democratic legitimacy was never one.91
Instead, Wilson urged public election merely to ensure that the
President was sufficiently qualified, an individual of “general noto-
riety,”92 or, as Morris put it, a person of “continental reputation.”93 
When the Convention finally did abandon election by the
legislature in favor of the peculiar electoral college, it did so not
from a desire to give the President democratic sanction, but from a
concern that legislative election would frustrate the proper workings
of Congress and ruin the Madisonian project of controlling faction.94
Gouverneur Morris formulated the decisive argument in mid-July
when he claimed that “[i]f the Legislature elect, it will be the work
of intrigue, of cabal, and of faction; it will be like the election of a
88. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 5, at 31; see also 3
THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 84, at 518 (“[I]t will be found impracticable to elect
[the President] by the immediate suffrages of the people. Difficulties would arise from the
extent and population of the states.”). In addition, there was the ever-lurking sectional divide.
If the people did happen to acquire information enough to form a national majority, southern
delegates feared that it would be the majority North against the minority South, on the
assumption that northerners would always outnumber the free white voters of the southern
slave states. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 5, at 57;
see also RAKOVE, supra note 38, at 259. 
89. JAMES W. CEASER, PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION: THEORY AND DEVELOPMENT 75 (1979).
90. Cf. id.
91. Id. 
92. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 5, at 68. 
93. 2 id. at 29. 
94. Riker, supra note 70, at 7-14 (providing an overview of the process by which electoral
college selection was chosen by the Convention). 
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pope by a conclave of cardinals; real merit will rarely be the title to
the appointment.”95 By “intrigue” Morris meant deal-making, horse-
trading, log-rolling—the sort of factional trade-offs that regularly
occurred in the formation of parliamentary cabinet governments,96
the sort of thing that dominated the legislatures in the states, and
just what the Madisonian system was designed to prevent.97 This
was the argument that persuaded Madison himself, initially a
supporter of congressional election, to support first popular election
of the President and then an electoral college.98 And it was the
argument that carried the day in the Convention’s closing weeks in
September, when delegates found themselves snared in a voting
cycle triggered by John Rutledge.99 
By late summer the Convention had, in a series of votes rejecting
both popular election and election by popularly chosen electors,
apparently reached consensus in favor of presidential election by the
legislature.100 But then on August 24, John Rutledge of South
Carolina moved to elect the President by joint ballot of the two
houses.101 Small states balked, fearing that votes from the large
states in the House of Representatives would overwhelm their votes
in the Senate, thus giving the large states control of the
presidency.102 Suddenly neither election by legislature with joint
ballot, nor election by the Senate voting singly, nor election by some
type of elector could command a majority.103 Fearing deadlock, the
delegates referred the question to the Committee on Postponed
Matters on August 31.104
95. 2 1787: DRAFTING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, supra note 58, at 1126. 
96. See Riker, supra note 70, at 7. 
97. See VILE, supra note 40, at 155-57; Kendall, supra note 54, at 331-32.
98. See Riker, supra note 70, at 3-5. 
99. See id.
100. The roll call votes were 215 and 225. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787, supra note 5, at 98, 118. 
101.  Id. at 401. 
102. Roger Sherman, for example, argued that a joint ballot would deprive the “States
represented in the Senate of the negative intended them in that house.” Id. And this was
indeed likely Rutledge’s purpose. See Riker, supra note 70, at 12-13. 
103. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 5, at 399
(providing data on who supported and opposed these options in roll call votes 356 and 361);
see also Riker, supra note 70, at 12-13. 
104. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 5, at 473. 
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Working over a single weekend in early September, the Commit-
tee devised the electoral college.105 In what would become familiar
language, the Committee draft provided that “[e]ach State shall
appoint in such manner as its Legislature may direct, a number of
electors equal to the whole number of Senators and members of the
House of Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the
Legislature.”106 The electors thus appointed were to “meet in their
respective States, and vote by ballot for two persons, of whom one
at least shall not be an inhabitant of the same State with them-
selves.”107 The person with the most votes became President, the one
with the second-most, Vice-President.108 In the event of a tie, the
Senate would choose between the candidates.109 Should no contender
receive a majority of votes, the Senate would choose from among
“the five highest on the list.”110 
The Convention’s reaction on September 4 was positive, or at
least relieved.111 Large-state delegates were pleased with their
advantage in the total number of electors, which were weighted by
population. Small-state delegates secured referral to the Senate in
the event of a tie or indeterminate electoral vote, rather than to the
House.112 The only remaining hitch was the delegates’ swelling
concern that the Senate’s legislative power—its say in treaty
making and appointments and now its role in presidential
election—would allow the Senate to dominate the government.113
The problem was neatly solved when dual motions by Hugh
Williamson and Roger Sherman proposed to transfer the voting in
a disputed election from the Senate to the House which, to pacify
small states, would cast ballots by state delegation.114 The compro-
mise took hold and the electoral college was born. 
105. See Shlomo Slonim, The Electoral College at Philadelphia: The Evolution of an Ad Hoc
Congress for the Selection of a President, 73 J. AM. HIST. 35, 51 (1986). 
106. 2 1787: DRAFTING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, supra note 58, at 1166. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Id.
111. See id. at 1167-69. 
112. See Riker, supra note 70, at 13. 
113. See, e.g., 2 1787: DRAFTING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, supra note 58, at 1166-69; 2 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 5, at 522-24. 
114. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 5, at 527. 
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One delegate to the Virginia ratifying convention would later
complain that the college “seems rather founded on accident than
any principle of government I ever heard of,”115 but that assessment
is perhaps too ungenerous. The plan did have an overarching
principle, fully in keeping with the political science that animated
the broader Madisonian project: to preserve the separation of the
Executive from Congress in order to correct the defects of the
legislative branch and avoid the “intrigue” and “cabal” that could
wreck deliberative government.116 What the electoral college did not
do, what in fact the delegates had no concern to do, was link the
President to popular majorities.117
While the finalized Article II permitted the state legislatures to
designate any method for choosing the electors they liked, including
public voting, the actual decision on the candidates was to rest in
the first place with the electors themselves, not the people, and
quite possibly with the House as an ultimate matter.118 Madison
explained to the Virginia ratifying convention that the delegates
found it “impracticable to elect [the President] by the immediate
suffrages of the people” and as a result believed that “the people
[should] choose the electors.”119 Hamilton elaborated the point in
Federalist No. 68. It was “peculiarly desirable” in the election of the
Executive, he wrote, “to afford as little opportunity as possible” to
the sort of “tumult and disorder” that frequently accompanied public
elections.120 The solution was to permit “the sense of the people [to]
operate in the choice of the person to whom so important a trust was
to be confided”121 while committing the actual power of election to
“an intermediate body of electors.”122 This arrangement would
forestall the “heats and ferments” characteristic of popular voting,
and prevent their “communication,” like a disease, from the people
to the chief executive.123 Indeed, most of the Philadelphia delegates
115. 3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 84, at 516. 
116. Morris defended the college on these terms. See 2 1787: DRAFTING THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION, supra note 58, at 1167, 1175-76; Riker, supra note 70, at 13. 
117. See CEASER, supra note 89, at 51. 
118. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
119. 3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 84, at 518.
120. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 7, at 441 (Alexander Hamilton). 
121. Id. at 440 (emphasis added). 
122. Id. at 441. 
123. Id. 
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expected that it was the House that would ultimately choose the
President in the normal course. They saw the electoral college as a
sort of presidential primary, narrowing the field, with the House
making the final decision “nineteen times in twenty.”124 Either way,
the President was not in any meaningful way to be elected by the
public. 
In fact, the office was not designed to be politically contested at
all.125 The mechanics of the electoral college deliberately frustrated
attempts at coordinated voting. Electors were to meet on the same
day to cast their ballots, but “in their respective States,”126 meaning
there would be no oppportunity for deliberation as a “college.”127
They were to vote for two candidates and could not designate which
was their first choice and which second.128 Once the votes were cast,
the “college”—more accurately, the discrete bands of state
electors—dissolved, never to assemble again.129 As historian Jack
Rakove has observed, “few of the framers anticipated, much less
intended, that the election of the president would soon emerge as
the most important stimulus for political innovation and the
creation of alliances running across state lines.”130 The Philadelphia
system was not built for organized political competition.
And all this means that the President was not meant to be a
representative of the people, at least not in any direct sense.
Congress was the representative branch. George Washington
captured the Framers’ understanding when he professed in 1790 to
have “always believed that an unequivocally free and equal
representation of the people in the legislature, together with an
efficient and responsible executive, were the great pillars on which
the preservation of American freedom must depend.”131 Convention
124. 2 1787: DRAFTING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, supra note 58, at 1167 (quoting George
Mason). Hamilton was of the same view. See id., at 1176; RAKOVE, supra note 38, at 265-66. 
125. See CEASER, supra note 89, at 51. 
126. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend XII.
127. See KURODA, supra note 2, at 23.
128. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend XII.
129. See KURODA, supra note 2, at 23; Jack N. Rakove, The Political Presidency: Discovery
and Intervention, in THE REVOLUTION OF 1800: DEMOCRACY, RACE, AND THE NEW REPUBLIC
38, 50 (James Horn et al. eds., 2002).
130. RAKOVE, supra note 38, at 266. 
131. Letter from George Washington to Catherine Macaulay Graham (Jan. 9, 1790), in 11
THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 461 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1891)
1522 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1501
attendees repeatedly referred to Congress as the people’s forum and
members of Congress as the people’s representatives.132 They never
spoke of the President in that manner.133 To be sure, delegates did
sometimes refer to the President as a “representative,” but it was as
a representative of the national interest—an agent of the common
good—something the Framers hoped the President would be by
virtue of his independence from the Legislature, not as a popular
representative of the people.134 Madison voiced this view at the
Convention when he commented that “[t]he Executive Magistrate
would be considered as a national officer, acting for and equally
sympathising with every part of the United States.”135 Gouverneur
Morris, in defending the President’s share of the treaty power,
similarly called the Executive “the general Guardian of the National
interests.”136 James Wilson made the same point the following year,
during the ratification debates. “[B]eing elected by different parts of
the United States, ... [the President] will consider himself as not
particularly interested for any one of them, but will watch over the
whole with paternal care and affection.”137 It was in this sense and
this sense only, as a disinterested agent of the public good, that the
Framers referred to the President as a “man of the people.”138 The
Framers’ presidency, in sum, was not a popular or majoritarian
office. However they envisioned the contours of executive power, the
Framers did not envision it as political authority. 
(emphasis added).
132. See supra notes 29, 44-55 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 30-32, 66-74 and accompanying text.
134. See id.
135. 2 1787, DRAFTING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, supra note 58, at 1241. Madison repeated
this view during the Virginia ratification debates. See 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 487, 494 (Jonathan Elliott
ed., 2d ed. 1861). 
136. 2 1787: DRAFTING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, supra note 58, at 1268; 2 THE RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 5, at 541. 
137. 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION:
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES, PENNSYLVANIA 452 (John P. Kaminski &
Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 2001); see also Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105
YALE L.J. 1725, 1805 (1996). 
138. 2 1787, DRAFTING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, supra note 58, at 1262-63 (quoting James
Wilson); see also CEASER, supra note 89, at 50 (“The presidency, they thought, could be so
constituted as to reach beyond the partial and selfish interests of any group within society and
consult the public interest as a whole.”). 
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The ratifiers did not anticipate a political presidency either. Once
the Grand Convention disbanded and the new Constitution began
to circulate “out of doors,” opponents objected to the presidency on
multiple grounds, but the President’s political character was not one
of them. 
Some of the Constitution’s opponents objected to the President’s
unitary design and connection to the military. The President,
Patrick Henry forecasted with his trademark melodrama, would be
an “American Dictator,”139 not because he would overwhelm
Congress with his political authority, but rather because he
commanded the armed forces. “[T]he army will salute him monarch:
your militia will leave you, and assist in making him king[:] ... and
what have you to oppose this force?” Henry taunted.140 
Other Antifederalists charged that the President was not strong
or independent enough to resist the machinations of the Senate.
“The executive is, in fact, the president and senate in all transac-
tions of any importance,” the Federal Farmer complained.141 “[H]e
may always act with the senate, but never can effectually counteract
its views.”142 The Centinel letters argued the same point: “The
President ... [will] be a mere pageant of state, unless he coincides
with the views of the Senate.”143 He will “either become the head of
the aristocratic junto in that body, or its minion.”144 Antifederalist
criticisms were diverse, but had at least one thing in common: the
failure to imagine the President as a political leader working within
the Constitution’s new political system.145 As Ralph Ketcham has
summarized, “There was surprisingly little concentration by the
Anti-federalists on executive powers as such.”146
139. Patrick Henry, Speeches of Patrick Henry in the Virginia Ratifying Convention, June
9, 1788, in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 207, 230 para. 5.16.11 (Herbert J. Storing ed.,
1981). 
140. 3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, supra note 84, at 513. 
141. Observations Leading to a Fair Examination of the System of Government Proposed
by the Late Convention; and to Several Essential and Necessary Alterations in It. In a Number
of Letters from Federal Farmer to the Republican, 1787, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST
supra note 139, at 214, 237 para. 2.8.29 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (emphasis added). 
142. Id. 
143. Letters of Centinel, (Oct. 1787), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 139,
at 142 para. 2.7.23 (emphasis added). 
144. Id. 
145. See RAKOVE, supra note 38, at 268-79. 
146. KETCHAM, supra note 66, at 82. Or as Jack Rakove has put it, “The experience and
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Of all the protagonists involved in drafting and ratification, it was
Alexander Hamilton who came closest to foretelling the President’s
future political role. Long an advocate of executive leadership,147
Hamilton’s Federalist essays described a President who would
energetically administer the government.148 Indeed, Hamilton
appeared in some passages of those famous newspaper commentar-
ies to regard the President as a political representative of the
people. One of the few outright errors in the Federalist collection
comes in Federalist No. 68, in which Hamilton casually remarked
that “the people of each State shall choose a number of persons as
electors.”149 Of course it was up to the state legislatures, not the
people themselves, to decide how the electors would be chosen.
Popular election was only one of the options. Still, the slip is
significant if it reveals that Hamilton thought of the President as
the people’s choice.
But it likely does not. In that same essay, Hamilton explained at
some length the necessity of separating the election of the President
from the people, the better to insulate the chief magistrate from the
“heats and ferments” of popular opinion.150 When Hamilton referred
to the President as the choice of the people, not only in Federalist
No. 68 but also across the series of essays focused on the Executive,
he meant, once again, that the President would represent the
interests of the people.151 
Hamilton never advocated a political President at the Convention
or during the ratification debates. He advocated political, policy-
making administrators. The difference is worth noting. The man
who wrote that “the true test of a good government is its aptitude
vocabulary of republican politics simply proved inadequate for conceiving the political
dimensions of the presidency, and as a result the ratification debates had strikingly little to
say about this novel institution.” Rakove, supra note 129, at 39.
147. For instance, he proposed a President for life at the Convention. See 1 THE RECORDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 5, at 292. 
148. “Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of good government.”
THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, supra note 7, at 451 (Alexander Hamilton); see also THE FEDERALIST
NO. 71, supra note 7, at 460 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[I]t is certainly desirable that the
Executive should be in a situation to dare to act his own opinion with vigor and decision.”). 
149. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 7, at 443 (Alexander Hamilton). 
150. See id. at 440-44. 
151. See supra notes 131-38 and accompanying text. 
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and tendency to produce a good administration”152 wanted a
professional, and perhaps permanent, cadre of civil servants to
devise policy and carry it into action.153 These administrators would
be supervised by the President, but not necessarily directed by
him.154 Hamilton apparently envisioned the President as a sort of
figurehead, presiding in a politically neutral fashion over a govern-
ment run by powerful administrative agents.155 Hamilton’s vision
was for what historian Forrest McDonald has called “a permanent
ministry independent of the president—or, as in the parliamentary
system, one responsible to the legislative as well as the execu-
tive.”156 These views were out of step with the rest of the Framers to
the extent Hamilton foresaw an entity other than Congress at the
center of the government, and his alternative vision would soon
provoke considerable strife. But at least in 1787 and 1788, it was
not a vision for a political presidency.157 
To sum up: the Framers created a constitutional system geared
to produce deliberative government.158 They placed a renovated
Congress at its center and constructed an independent executive
branch under the direction of a single President to balance Con-
gress, supply its defects, and administer its laws.159 The Article II
presidency was a potent office but not, critically, a political one.160
The President was not connected directly to the people, was not a
popular representative, and lacked democratic warrants for
action.161 
These are important insights because they challenge so much of
the conventional wisdom about the original Article II Executive.
Proponents of the unitary Executive have placed great stock in the
152. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 7, at 443 (Alexander Hamilton). 
153. See Jeremy D. Bailey, The New Unitary Executive and Democratic Theory: The
Problem of Alexander Hamilton, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 453, 459-61 (2008) (discussing
Hamilton’s view of presidential removal powers). 
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. FORREST MCDONALD, ALEXANDER HAMILTON: A BIOGRAPHY 131 (1979); Bailey, supra
note 153, at 460. 
157. But see Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive,
48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 38 (1994). 
158. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 66-79 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 66-79 and accompanying text.
1526 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:1501
President’s supposedly representative character. John Yoo has
stated matter of factly that a prominent theme in the federal
Constitution is that “[t]he president is seen as the representative
and protector of the people,” that, indeed, the presidency was meant
“as not merely an executor of legislation, but as a new institution
that represented the will of the people.”162 On this basis, Yoo argues
for an expansive interpretation of the Vesting Clause,163 including
the right to act beyond and sometimes contrary to the letter of the
law.164 Steven Calabresi also has relied on what he calls the
Framers’ “deliberat[e] and self consciou[s] cho[ice] to break with
th[e] post-1776 preference for weak executives” and create a
“powerful, plebiscitary office.”165 He cites this claim as one reason to
read the Vesting Clause to give the President control over officers
within the executive branch.166 But all this turns out to be
untrue—or more accurately, it turns out to be anachronistic. The
presidency would become a representative office, but the text of 1787
did not make it one. To the extent the case for the unitary Executive
depends heavily, even critically, on the President’s political
character, the case cannot be rooted in the original Article II alone. 
Some of the most prominent critics of the unitary theory have
likewise assumed that the presidency is and was meant to be a
representative institution, or a political office of some type.167 Cass
Sunstein and Larry Lessig began with that assumption in their
seminal article, The President and the Administration, and pro-
ceeded to explain both the lack of a textual removal power and
Congress’s rather active involvement in administration during
the 1790s on the basis of a distinction between “political” and
162. JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AFTER 9/11, at 71, 96 (2005). 
163. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl.1.
164. See YOO, supra note 162, at 18-19. 
165. Calabresi, supra note 1, at 479; see also CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 62, at 34-38. 
166. See CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 62, at 4-9; see also Steven G. Calabresi, The Vesting
Clauses as Power Grants, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1377, 1388 (1994); Steven G. Calabresi &
Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 570-81
(1994); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1178-79, 1182 n.145 (1992). 
167. See Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 39-41 (1994). 
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“administrative” authority.168 But as they ultimately acknowledge,
this division is more nineteenth-century gloss than original
understanding169 and, in any event, misleading.170 
Akhil Amar has recently argued that the Framers deliberately
left Article II’s terms opaque and its arrangement untidy in the
expectation that George Washington would supply the definition of
executive power through his practice as the first President.171
Indeed, Amar goes so far as to claim that the Convention intended
to delegate to Washington the authority to do so.172 But this
hypothesis is premised almost exclusively on a single comment in a
private letter from Pierce Butler to a relative,173 and as historians
have long pointed out, it “hardly squares with the tangled record of
proposals, tentative decisions, reconsiderations, and reversals from
which the presidency finally, and belatedly, emerged.”174
The ambiguity that attended the original Executive and early
administrative practice owes less to some implicit delegation of
interpretive authority to George Washington, or to a division
between “political” and “administrative” power, than to the Presi-
dent’s uncertain political status. The Framers could neglect to give
the President full control over the executive branch, fail to define
“executive power,” and remain comfortable with significant
congressional involvement in administration precisely because they
did not anticipate the President acting as a political leader, and
certainly not as the political leader.175 Politics was something for
Congress to make and do. When the President began to engage in
politics, the Founders’ assignment of powers became far more
contentious and their rationale for crafting Article II as they did
increasingly hard to fathom. But then that is the story of the 1790s
and the watershed election of 1800.
168. Id.
169. See id. at 42. 
170. See Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 166, at 1173. 
171. AMAR, supra note 2, at 313-14.
172. Id. 
173. See Letter from Pierce Butler to Weedon Butler (May 5, 1788), in 3 THE RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 5, at 302. 
174. RAKOVE, supra note 38, at 244. 
175. See supra notes 65-79 and accompanying text.
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II. THE ROAD TO THE POLITICAL PRESIDENCY
In forging a new model of government, the Framers had hoped to
settle certain political questions once and for all. Madison opined in
Federalist No. 49 that after ratification, frequent appeals to the
people would no longer be necessary—in fact they would be malign,
insofar as they kept in dispute fundamental questions of political
principle.176 The 1790s revealed that a great many political princi-
ples were not settled after all.177 Sparked by Alexander Hamilton’s
ambitious banking and manufacturing plans, and fanned by the
revolution in France, political controversy blazed in the 1790s.178
That such deep and principled political disagreement would persist
after the Constitution’s adoption came as a shock to the decade’s
political actors.179 But perhaps more surprising still was the role the
presidency played in the decade’s political conflagrations. The
controversies of the 1790s revealed that in designing the presidency
as they did, the Framers inadvertently vested the office with sizable
political potential.180 The structure of the branch permitted it to
formulate policy and influence the legislature.181 Indeed, the
structure of the office uniquely suited it to exercise power. These
facts—unintended, unlooked for, and largely unwanted—made the
presidency an engine of political strife and an object of political
competition. By decade’s end, contending factions schemed to gain
control of the government by gaining control of the Executive. 
The discovery of the Executive’s political potential plunged the
republic into crisis. Neither the Framers nor any other political
actor had developed an account of the presidency as a political
office.182 This proved to be a dangerous intellectual deficit. Political
leaders’ inability to agree on how the presidency should operate and
to whom it should be accountable nearly provoked armed conflict.183
176. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, supra note 7, at 349 (James Madison). 
177. See infra Part II.A.1.
178. See infra Part II.A.1.
179. See infra Part II.A.1.
180. See infra Part II.A.1.
181. See infra Part II.A.1.
182. See supra notes 65-79 and accompanying text.
183. See infra Part II.A.2.
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In the end, the crisis gave way to a new conception of the presidency
that would require a new constitutional amendment for its realiza-
tion.184 This Part takes up each installment of this story in turn. I
begin with the discovery of the Executive’s political potential and its
destabilizing consequences and then turn to the new constitutional
synthesis that provided the apology for the Twelfth Amendment. 
A. Political Potentials
1. Politics and Structure
The opening years of the 1790s destroyed any expectation that
constitutional disputes were a thing of the past. There was Alexan-
der Hamilton to thank for that. Hamilton’s ambition as Secretary of
the Treasury to transform America’s agrarian economy into a
commercialized and manufacturing powerhouse provoked fierce
dissent.185 In a series of three reports to Congress, Hamilton
proposed to charter a national bank, levy new internal taxes, and
increase foreign impost revenues.186 His broader aims were to create
a stable national currency and provide the nation’s merchants
access to large pools of capital.187 James Madison and Thomas
Jefferson read in Hamilton’s proposals a covert bid to convert the
republic into a capitalist aristocracy.188 They were especially
alarmed by Hamilton’s enthusiasm for federal power.189 By the early
1790s they had assembled a robust (if minority) opposition in
Congress.190 
The train of revolution in France only heightened America’s
burgeoning political tension. Jefferson, in particular, sympathized
with the revolutionaries and linked their struggle against monarchy
to his and Madison’s opposition to the Hamilton economic
184. See infra Part II.A.2.
185. See SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: JEFFERSON TO LINCOLN 43-44
(2005). 
186. See id. at 44.
187. See STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 92-194 (1993);
WILENTZ, supra note 185, at 44.
188. See WILENTZ, supra note 185, at 45. 
189. See id.
190. See id. at 48. 
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program.191 The fight against Hamilton was a fight, Jefferson came
to say, against “monocracy.”192 The Jefferson-Madison alliance took
to calling itself “Democratic-Republican[s],” after the name of the
private societies formed in Philadelphia and elsewhere to support
the French Revolution.193 Hamilton and his supporters, meanwhile,
viewed the Republicans’ sympathy for the French cause with alarm
and read in their opposition to economic development a Jacobin
agenda for radical social leveling.194 Politics was back with a
vengeance. 
And the second great surprise of the decade was the degree to
which the executive branch was at the center of it. Though the
Framers had built Congress to function as the locus of positive
government,195 already by the early 1790s the executive branch was
exerting appreciable influence on congressional deliberation and
policy-making. No doubt this development owed something to the
personal skill of Hamilton, who creatively leveraged the resources
of his Treasury post to shape Congress’s work.196 But above all, it
was due to structure. 
By design, the Framers gave the presidency very little authority
that would stand on its own. The President shares his most weighty
executive powers with Congress, at least in some manner. The
President’s treaty and appointments powers are divided with the
Senate;197 the veto power is subject to congressional override;198 and
even the commander-in-chief power, the most potent of the authori-
ties spelled out in Article II, is qualified by Congress’s rights to
declare war,199 to appropriate funds for the military,200 to make rules
governing the armed forces,201 to call forth the militia,202 and to
191. See id. at 47. 
192. Id.
193. See id. at 53. 
194. Cf. id. at 47.
195. See supra Part I.A.
196. See RALPH VOLNEY HARLOW, THE HISTORY OF LEGISLATIVE METHODS IN THE PERIOD
BEFORE 1825, at 141-43 (1917); WHITE, supra note 57, at 56. 
197. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
198. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
199. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
200. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
201. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
202. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
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organize, arm, and discipline the militia as Congress sees fit.203 As
for the President’s remaining Article II powers—like the authority
to require opinions from department heads204 or adjourn Congress
when the houses could not agree205—they are more nearly ministe-
rial in character. The upshot is that the President has relatively few
powers not shared with Congress, and thus relatively little room to
maneuver apart from congressional cooperation.206 
And yet, as Charles Black noticed nearly four decades ago, the
Article II presidency was exceptionally well structured for the
receipt and exercise of power.207 In placing the branch under the
direction of a single officer rather than several, the Constitution
permitted the Executive to act with unity of purpose.208 In freeing
the President of the need to explain his decisions to a council of
state,209 or otherwise seek cabinet officers’ input before acting, the
Constitution allowed him to act with “dispatch.”210 By investing him
with some sort of authority over cabinet ministers,211 the document
made it possible for him to develop, review, and implement policy. 
Congress, by contrast, was handicapped in the exercise of power
by just those mechanisms needed to avoid majoritarianism.212 The
division into two houses, each chosen by a different electorate,
meant congressional leaders could not use a single majority to enact
legislation; they would have to build a different coalition in each
body.213 That same division made devising a coherent policy agenda
203. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16. 
204. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl 1. 
205. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
206. Justice Jackson made this point in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
207. See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Working Balance of the American Political Departments,
1 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 13, 17 (1974). 
208. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, supra note 7, (Alexander Hamilton).
209. Executive councils were a familiar feature in the states, see RAKOVE, supra note 38,
at 269, and the working draft of what became Article II contained one until early September,
when it was eliminated in committee, see 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, supra note 5, at 541-42. 
210. See 2 1787: DRAFTING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, supra note 58, at 1226 (quoting James
Wilson); see also id. at 1099 (quoting Edmund Randolph); THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander
Hamilton). 
211. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
212. See Black, supra note 207, at 16-17. 
213. See id. 
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quite difficult because the two houses were elected to staggered
terms, by different sets of voters, and thus populated with members
who came to Congress with differing policy priorities.214 And then
there was the congressional leadership: the Constitution provided
for none, certainly for none that straddled the two houses, making
the inter-house coordination problem acute.215
In the 1790s, these structural features began to play themselves
out. Lacking the institutional means to develop policy, Congress
turned to the Executive for help, and did so quite early on. It was
Congress that initiated Hamilton’s famous troika of reports to help
it craft an economic program.216 Indeed, the First and Second
Congresses made a practice of referring fiscal questions to the
Treasury for counsel.217 Hamilton skillfully drafted his replies,
crafting his answers in the form of policy recommendations so as to
exert maximum influence on the legislative agenda.218 Soon
Hamilton and his staff were drafting legislation and forwarding it
to friendly congressmen.219 Secretary of State Jefferson did the same
(though less frequently) on matters related to his department.220 By
the time of his resignation in 1795, Hamilton was known to visit
Congress in person to lobby individual members, to attend commit-
tee hearings, to speak at legislative caucuses, and even to designate
the membership of the committees to which his measures would be
referred.221 “Nothing,” Senator William Maclay of Pennsylvania
said, “is done without him.”222 
Here again, Hamilton’s unique talents and ambition surely
accounted for some of these developments, but on the whole,
constitutional structure drove the institutional praxis of the
1790s.223 A constitutionally powerful but structurally disadvantaged
214. See Kendall, supra note 54, at 330-31. 
215. These structural features have been thoroughly analyzed in the political science
literature. See, e.g., RAYMOND TATALOVICH & THOMAS S. ENGEMAN, THE PRESIDENCY AND
POLITICAL SCIENCE: TWO HUNDRED YEARS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE 199-201 (2003). 
216. See WHITE, supra note 57, at 56. 
217. See id. 
218. See id. 
219. See id. 
220. See id. at 57. 
221. Id. at 58.
222. HARLOW, supra note 196, at 141. 
223. See David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The First Congress and the
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Congress found itself turning again and again to a constitutionally
weaker but structurally privileged Executive for aid in the business
of governing.224 This was not because Washington himself was
committed to a political use of the presidency. On the contrary,
Washington saw himself as a non-partisan figure and his office as
an apolitical one.225 He scrupulously avoided political statements,
declined to lobby members of Congress, and generally refused to
exercise his veto power for policy reasons.226 He considered but
removed policy language in his first inaugural address.227 And
tellingly, his annual reports to Congress were almost entirely devoid
of policy recommendations, providing no direct guidance for
legislative programs.228 When he permitted his deputies, principally
Hamilton, to develop policy and recommend it to Congress, he
arguably did not regard those policies as properly his own.229
Instead, Washington, as President, pursued an essentially collabo-
rative politics, not so different, as one political scientist has
remarked, from the British king-in-council model.230 This collabora-
tive institutional behavior revealed Washington’s conception of the
President as a professional executor, above party and above politics,
with no distinct political or programmatic agenda of his own to
press.231
Still, the office was undeniably exerting political influence.232 And
that was unquestionably controversial. As early as Washington’s
first term, Madison and Jefferson grew uneasy with the influence
they were surprised to find the Executive exerting on Congress.233
In the House, Madison objected to Congress’s emerging practice of
Structure of Government, 1789-1791, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 161, 190 & n.196 (1995).
224. See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 57, at 58 (describing Hamilton’s role as an executive
representative in Congress).
225. See KETCHAM, supra note 66, at 72.
226. WHITE, supra note 57, at 54-55, 65. There are a few exceptions to Washington’s
apolitical stance, but their rarity proves the rule. See id. at 57.
227. BAILEY, supra note 2, at 136 (citing Fragments of a Draft of the First Inaugural
Address, in GEORGE WASHINGTON WRITINGS 702-16 (John Rhodehannel ed., 1997)). 
228. Currie, supra note 223, at 188.
229. See WHITE, supra note 57, at 54-58.
230. GEORGE C. EDWARDS III, ON DEAF EARS: THE LIMITS OF THE BULLY PULPIT 115 (2003);
see also KETCHAM, supra note 66, at 89-93.
231. See EDWARDS, supra note 230, at 115; WHITE, supra note 57, at 54-58. 
232. See, e.g., KETCHAM, supra note 66, at 91-92.
233. See WHITE, supra note 57, at 69-70.
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referring policy questions to the executive branch for advice.234 He
repeatedly pressed to stop those referrals and finally succeeded in
1795.235 Madison was even less sanguine about executive lobbying,
bill drafting, and influence on the legislative calendar. Partly at
Madison’s behest, the Third Congress amended the House’s rules to
require every proposed revenue law to be debated in the Committee
of the Whole; the new rules similarly forbade the House from
approving any tax increase until debated on the floor.236 The intent
of both changes was to frustrate outside executive influence on the
House’s procedures.237 Madison also spearheaded the creation of two
standing committees to assist the House in policy development,
again with the aim of countering executive pressure.238 
In sum, although the structure of the two branches may have
been familiar to political actors,239 the practical consequences of that
structure were not. On the contrary, Madison, Jefferson, and their
allies blamed Hamilton for what they perceived to be a fundamental
misuse of executive authority.240 
But the effects of structure could not be denied. By the end of
Washington’s tenure, both Madison and Jefferson recognized the
political potential Article II created in the presidency.241 They
concluded that controlling the legislature was not enough to control
the government because the presidency had proved too consequen-
tial. If they wanted to direct the state, they needed to capture the
Executive.242 This was the fact of constitutional structure. It was a
fact not lost on Hamilton and his Federalist cohort either. Before
Washington left office, both Federalists and Republicans began
assembling party organizations for the purpose of amassing enough
electoral votes in the states to elevate their favored candidate.243 Yet
234. See id. at 69-72. 
235. Id. at 73-74. 
236. LEONARD D. WHITE, THE JEFFERSONIANS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 1801-
1829, at 46 (1959). 
237. Id. 
238. Id. at 46-47. 
239. After all, Madison was more responsible than anyone for the final shape of the
Constitution. See RAKOVE, supra note 38, at 35-56.
240. See WILENTZ, supra note 185, at 48. 
241. See Rakove, supra note 129, at 45.
242. See id.
243. See id. at 50-53.
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this dawning realization of the presidency’s political potential and
the race to capture it posed two profound problems for the constitu-
tional order—one conceptual and one structural. 
The conceptual problem was that no set of political actors had yet
developed an account of the Executive and its place within the
constitutional system that could explain the political potential the
1790s had made apparent, or justify using the presidency for
political ends.244 The structural problem was that Article II was not
designed to permit electoral competition for the executive office.245
If both Republicans and Federalists understood by the mid-1790s
that they needed to win control of the Executive to control the
government, the Constitution gave them no clear, or clearly
legitimate, method for doing so.246 These problems merged to
produce the wrenching constitutional crisis of 1800.
2. The Crisis of 1800
Precisely as Article II contemplated with its provisions leaving
the time and manner of selecting electors to the states, the presiden-
tial election in 1800 was more exactly a series of discrete state
elections than a national one.247 Five states that year chose their
college members by popular election—Virginia, Maryland, Rhode
Island, North Carolina, and Kentucky.248 Virginia and Kentucky
elected by general ticket, while the other three conducted elections
in congressional districts.249 Ten of the remaining eleven states
chose electors in the state legislature;250 Vermont, meanwhile,
delegated the choice to a “grand committee” consisting of the
governor, an executive council, and the state house of representa-
tives.251 The elections occurred at various points through the
summer and fall.252 In the run-up, both Republicans and Federalists
244. See BAILEY, supra note 2, at 132-33.
245. CEASER, supra note 89, at 51.
246. Id.
247. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII; see KURODA, supra
note 2, at 83-98. 
248. KURODA, supra note 2, at 94-95. 
249. Id. 
250. See id. at 83.
251. Id. at 93-94. 
252. Id. at 88.
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organized feverishly to persuade the relevant voters to choose
electors pledged to their particular candidates.253 In hopes of making
at least some sort of coordinated voting possible in the electoral
college, Republican congressmen caucused in May 1800 to designate
their preferred candidates for President and Vice-President.254 They
settled on Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr.255 Federalist congress-
men, guided by Alexander Hamilton, used the same mechanism to
choose incumbent John Adams as their presidential candidate and
Charles Pinckney for Vice-President.256 
But thanks to Article II’s electoral college, all the planning and
maneuvering and attempted coordination yielded an unexpected
result. The Republicans outpolled Adams and Pinckney, who
received sixty-five and sixty-four votes, respectively.257 But, unable
to know how other Republican electors had voted in other states, or
indeed whether Federalist electors had (as Hamilton advised)
concentrated their second votes behind Pinckney in an effort to
elevate him over the Republican choice, the Republican electors
failed to divert at least one of their second votes to a candidate other
than Burr.258 In so doing, they denied Jefferson an outright major-
ity.259 When all the ballots were counted, Jefferson and Burr had
sixty-nine votes apiece.260 According to the rules of Article II, the
election moved immediately to the House of Representatives, which
would decide between the top five candidates.261 As only five
candidates had received votes from the electors, all options were, so
to speak, on the table. Due to a quirk of tradition, however, the new
Congress with its healthy Republican majority, would not convene
until after the new President was sworn in, on March 4, 1801.262 So
253. See, e.g., Rakove, supra note 129, at 50-52. 
254. KURODA, supra note 2, at 87; WHITE, supra note 236, at 53.
255. See,e.g., KURODA, supra note 2, at 87; WHITE, supra note 236, at 53.
256. KURODA, supra note 2, at 87. 
257. Id. at 102.
258. Id. at 99. 
259. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 55. 
260. Id. The official counting of those electoral votes in the U.S. Senate was controversial
in and of itself—Georgia’s four electoral votes were not originally included due to
irregularities. See id. at 55-74.
261. See id. at 55.
262. KURODA, supra note 2, at 100; see also ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 59.
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it was the expiring, Federalist-controlled Sixth Congress that held
the fate of the presidency. 
For thirty-five ballots cast over six days, Federalist congressmen
persisted in refusing to vote for Thomas Jefferson, whom they
regarded as a threat to the very existence of the republic.263
Meanwhile, rumors raced about the capital. Members of the
Pennsylvania congressional delegation each received a letter from
Philadelphia Republicans, warning them that the day Congress
denied Jefferson or Burr the presidency would be “the first day of
revolution and Civil War.”264 Pennsylvania’s Republican governor,
Thomas McKean, went so far as to make preliminary preparations
to mobilize his state’s militia in the event the congressional
Federalists prevented the ascension of one of the Republican
candidates.265 Virginia’s James Monroe did the same.266 
The deep problems of the presidency’s unanticipated political
potential—mechanical and conceptual—were taking their toll. The
mechanical design of the electoral college, which forbade discrimina-
tion between presidential and vice-presidential votes,267 prevented
electors from communicating, and referred the top five vote-getters
to the House, kept Jefferson from winning the election even though
he was clearly the first choice of a majority of electors.268 Once the
election devolved on the (lame-duck) House of Representatives, the
conceptual problem proved just as intractable. Lacking a shared
idea as to whom the President was politically accountable and why,
Republicans and Federalists could not agree on which candidate the
House should elect. Republicans argued that the people’s choice, as
reflected in the electoral college, should control.269 Federalists
263. James E. Lewis, Jr., “What Is to Become of Our Government?”: The Revolutionary
Potential of the Election of 1800, in THE REVOLUTION OF 1800: DEMOCRACY, RACE, AND THE
NEW REPUBLIC, supra note 129, at 3, 9-10. 
264. JAMES ROGER SHARP, AMERICAN POLITICS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE NEW NATION
IN CRISIS 268 (1993). 
265. Id. at 268-69.
266. Id.; see also Michael A. Bellesiles, “The Soil Will Be Soaked with Blood”: Taking the
Revolution of 1800 Seriously, in THE REVOLUTION OF 1800: DEMOCRACY, RACE, AND THE NEW
REPUBLIC, supra note 129, at 59, 72.
267. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl.3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
268. See Rakove, supra note 129, at 30.
269. See Joanne B. Freeman, Corruption and Compromise in the Election of 1800, in THE
REVOLUTION OF 1800: DEMOCRACY, RACE, AND THE NEW REPUBLIC, supra note 129, at 87, 105.
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rejected this populist theory of presidential election and seemed
initially determined to choose the candidate they thought best for
the Union, regardless of how the electors voted.270
Shaken by threats of armed conflict and the specter of disunion,
and following a decisive intervention by Alexander Hamilton, who
urged compromise,271 Federalist congressmen finally relented. On
February 17, 1801, the House of Representatives elected Thomas
Jefferson on the thirty-sixth ballot, ten states to four, with two
abstaining.272 The Federalists’ stand-down resolved the electoral
crisis, but provided no answers to the emergent problem of the
politicized presidency. 
In the immediately following years, those answers would come
from the supposed skeptics of executive power, the Jefferson-led
Republicans. Over the course of the election of 1800 and the years
shortly following, the Republicans developed a new account of the
President’s connection to the people—one that would justify fresh
uses of presidential power and lead ultimately to a revised concep-
tion of the presidency as a political office.273 But the structure of the
Constitution had to be changed to make this reimagined presidency
a reality. In 1803, Republicans amended Article II to more directly
link the President and the people and to permit political partisans
to more effectively contest presidential elections.274 
In this way, the Twelfth Amendment reset the separation of
powers and changed American government. Before we can appreci-
ate fully the transformation it wrought, however, we must take
account of the idea that supplied its logic: the Republican case for
the political presidency. 
B. Reimagining the Executive
The Republicans developed their notion of a political Executive
over time and in various forums as they struggled to capture the
presidency, but it was their leader, Thomas Jefferson, who gave the
270. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 88; see generally Lewis, supra note 263, at 13-21.
271. See WILENTZ, supra note 185, at 93-94. 
272. KURODA, supra note 2, at 105. 
273. See Bailey, supra note 153, at 464.
274. KURODA, supra note 2, at 149 (describing the Republican party’s motivation for
creating the Twelfth Amendment).
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idea mature theoretical expression in his 1801 inaugural address.275
In those remarks, Jefferson outlined an office more populist, more
politically active, and more constitutionally central than the one
made in Philadelphia.276 As of 1801, however, the presidency
Jefferson described was an office founded only in speech. It would
require constitutional change to become a reality. 
Jefferson delivered his inaugural address on March 4, 1801 to a
Senate chamber so crowded that one observer, Margaret Bayard
Smith, declared she believed “not another creature could enter.”277
Jefferson’s new ideas about his office were evident almost immedi-
ately. Whereas Washington and Adams had both addressed their
inaugural remarks to Congress, Jefferson directed his speech to
“[f]riends [and] [f]ellow [c]itizens.”278 That was no coincidence.
Jefferson cast the President as an exponent and advocate of political
principle. That is, Jefferson reimagined the Executive as a political
actor.279 
According to Jefferson, it was not merely the President’s preroga-
tive, but his duty to found his administration on political principles
and to offer those principles to the people for their endorsement.280
Midway through his brief address, Jefferson announced he found it
only “proper” that his electorate “should understand what I deem
the essential principles of our government”—and proceeded to list
fourteen of them.281 Astute listeners quickly recognized “the
manifesto of the party and a declaration ... of [Jefferson’s] political
creed.”282 This was quite deliberate. Jefferson believed that the
President should act not as a king above party, but as a delegate of
the people, chosen by them to prosecute a political agenda they
approved. In his view, the presidency should be an instrument of
275. See 33 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 148-52 (Barbara B. Oberg et al. eds., 2006).
276. Id. at 150-51.
277. Id. at 134 (quoting Margaret Bayard Smith in a newspaper report). 
278. Id. at 148. 
279. BAILEY, supra note 2, at 140-45. 
280. See 33 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 275, at 150. 
281. Id. at 150-51. Jefferson’s points effectively repudiated the Alien and Sedition Acts and
Hamilton’s pro-debt and pro-manufacturing agenda, even as he praised state governments
and called for a return to an agricultural economy. See BAILEY, supra note 2, at 144-45. 
282. BAILEY, supra note 2, at 149 (quoting Alexander Baring); see also id. at 144-45; 33 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 275, at 151 (referring to points ten, thirteen, and
fourteeen).
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popular, majoritarian self-rule.283 A politically responsive, politically
accountable Executive was the principal means by which the people
exercised control over their government.284 In keeping with this
philosophy, Jefferson cast himself as the people’s representative. He
referred to “the post you [the people] have assigned me.”285 He asked
for the public’s “confidence” and for popular support against those
who opposed him.286 He concluded the address by promising to rely
“on the patronage of [the people’s] good will” to perform “with
obedience” the task they had assigned him, and “to retire from it
whenever you become sensible how much better choices it is in your
power to make.”287 This was the President as popular delegate.
For that model to work, however, presidential election had to
become something it had not been for the Framers in 1787: a type
of national plebiscite. The original Article II had taken care to
insulate the choice of the President from the “tumult and disorder”
of popular majorities.288 Jefferson now claimed that the great
purpose of presidential election was to give voice to majority
opinion. Republicans in Congress had made the same argument in
the throes of the 1800 election dispute, arguing as the Federalists
forced ballot after ballot that a vote to deny Jefferson the presidency
was a vote to usurp the rule of the people.289 At the hands of
Jefferson and the Republicans, the electoral college morphed from
an independent body of leading men with the authority to select the
President to a merely formal mechanism for expressing the major-
ity’s preference. 
And precisely because presidential elections should be, according
to Jefferson, a national plebiscite organized around the political
principles the candidates espoused, public endorsement of a given
candidate conferred public authority on the victor to enact his
principles.290 Thus Jefferson told his listeners that the political
points he deemed “essential” and which he understood the people to
283. Bailey, supra note 153, at 464. 
284. Id. at 143-45.
285. See 33 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 275, at 151 (emphasis added). 
286. Id. at 151-52. 
287. Id. at 152. 
288. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 7, at 441 (Alexander Hamilton). 
289. See KURODA, supra note 2, at 100; Lewis, supra note 263, at 15-16. 
290. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 245.
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have endorsed were principles he now intended to use “to shape [the
government’s] administration.”291 Put another way, the people’s
approval authorized the President to administer his office in a
political manner, according to a particular political agenda. 
With this logic, Jefferson decisively abandoned the apolitical
Executive the framers crafted in Philadelphia.292 The Jeffersonian
President was no patriot king; rather, an instrument of majority
rule. Indeed, for Jefferson, the election of the President, not
Congress, became the primary means by which the people expressed
their will in the constitutional system.293 
Yet however compelling this vision, it found no home in the
Constitution. The electoral college as Jefferson described it simply
did not exist, not in 1801. He might call his own election a national
plebiscite, but in fact the rules of Article II prevented the public,
when they were permitted to vote for electors at all, from designat-
ing which candidate they wanted for President and which for Vice-
President.294 The electoral college thus provided no mechanism for
the people to confer political approval on any specific candidate.
Article II also prevented coordination between electors, which in the
absence of ballot designation made organized party competition for
executive offices difficult at best.295 In frustrating both public
participation and organized electioneering, Article II forestalled just
the sort of national choice between competing political principles
Jefferson thought presidential election should become. If the
political presidency Jefferson described was to be fact, not just
rhetoric, Article II would have to change. And that is what the
Twelfth Amendment did. 
III. A REVOLUTION IN FORM
Most observers have missed the significance of the Twelfth
Amendment because of what it did not do. It did not abolish the
electoral college; it did not institute a direct national plebiscite; it
291. See 33 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 275, at 150. 
292. See ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 256.
293. See Bailey, supra note 153, at 464. 
294. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
295. See Rakove, supra note 129, at 31.
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did not direct the states to choose their electors by popular vote.296
At first glance, the Amendment seems to have done relatively little,
even to be, as Bruce Ackerman has recently said, “the very opposite
of a serious attempt to think the problem [of presidential selection]
through.”297
First glances can be deceiving. The Amendment in fact fundamen-
tally altered the operation of the electoral college, and with it, the
relationship between the executive and legislative branches. The
Amendment accomplished this by directing electors to designate
their ballots for President and Vice-President and by reducing
Congress’s role in presidential elections in favor of greater and more
direct control by the people. The effect was to facilitate political
competition for the Executive, further unify the branch under the
political control of the President, and make the President the choice
of popular majorities. These innovations converted the Philadelphia
presidency into a political one for good, shifting the structure of the
constitutional order along the way. In the end, the Republicans’
Twelfth Amendment gave the President’s executive powers new
scope and potentially new meaning, even as it produced a different
sort of politics from the one the Framers had anticipated—one no
longer congressional, but centered on the President. 
A. Enter the Twelfth Amendment
The Amendment began life on October 17, 1803, when Represen-
tative John Dawson, Republican from Virginia, introduced the
following resolution on the floor of the House:
That, in all future elections of President and Vice President, the
persons shall be particularly designated, by declaring which is
voted for as President, and which as Vice President.298
De Witt Clinton, Republican from New York, introduced substan-
tially similar language in the Senate four days later.299 Debate
296. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
297. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 247. 
298. 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 372 (1803). 
299. Id. at 16-17. 
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began first in the House, on October 19,300 and lasted for nine days,
with the House voting to approve an amendment proposal on
October 28.301 Meanwhile, Senators began debate on October 24, but
kept at it only briefly before various exigencies, including the need
to debate the Treaty of Paris with which President Jefferson
proposed to purchase the Louisiana territory,302 forced delay. The
Senate eventually returned to the Amendment on November 23.303
After a week of robust and sometimes heated debate, the Senate
approved on December 2, 1803 a version different from the House’s
text in a modest yet, as we shall see, critical way regarding the
number of candidates referred to the House in the case of a disputed
election.304 The House ultimately accepted the Senate’s version on
December 8.305 
As the Amendment cycled through Congress, debate narrowed to
three major issues. First was the Amendment’s leading feature, the
designation of ballots for President and Vice-President.306 Amend-
ment supporters in fact called the text the “designating” Amend-
ment.307 Designation was not a new idea; it had previously enjoyed
bipartisan support.308 But in the Eighth Congress, the designating
principle proved controversial. Once raised, it invited two additional
and difficult questions—the proper number of candidates to be
referred to the House in the event of a disputed election309 and the
status of the vice-presidency.310 These three issues together formed
300. Id. at 374.
301. Id. at 515-44. 
302. Id. at 21-31. 
303. Id. at 80-81.
304. KURODA, supra note 2, at 140-42.
305. 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 699-776 (1803); KURODA, supra note 2, at 147-48.
306. See KURODA, supra note 2, at 131.
307. 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 16 (1803) (statement of Rep. Clinton); see also KURODA, supra
note 2, at 127-31. 
308. Federalist congressmen proposed a designating amendment in 1798. Alexander
Hamilton had been a supporter and remained one after the 1800 election. In 1802, he helped
convince the New York legislature to adopt a resolution endorsing designation, along with
selection of electors by popular voting in congressional districts, which was the method he had
favored at the Philadelphia Convention. See Alexander Hamilton, Draft of a Resolution for the
Legislature of New York for the Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, January
29, 1802, in 25 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 512-13 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1977); see
also KURODA, supra note 2, at 119.
309. See KURODA, supra note 2, at 136.
310. See id. at 131.
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the core of congressional debate. Raised in sequence, each was
logically, even inseparably, connected to the other, and by the
conclusion of debate in early December, Republicans offered
essentially one argument on all three subjects: it was the right of
popular majorities to choose the President.311 Listening to their case,
the Federalist John Quincy Adams realized that Amendment
sponsors wanted to “reform [the Constitution’s] federative institu-
tions upon popular principles.”312 He was exactly correct. 
1. Debate in the House
The debate began in the House with designation.313 Dawson’s
terse initial draft called for ballot designation and nothing more,314
and Republicans made their case for it first on rather technical
grounds.315 Representative John Clopton, a Republican from
Virginia and one of the Amendment’s primary supporters, reminded
his listeners just how easy it was, in the absence of separate ballots
for President and Vice-President, for the electoral college to wind up
selecting as President a candidate who was the first choice of
practically no one.316 Clopton posed the hypothetical of an election
between four presidential candidates in which the electors split
their “first choice” votes between two candidates, while more or less
uniformly giving their “second choice” votes to a third and scattering
only a handful of votes to the fourth.317 The result was that the third
candidate, whom no elector wanted to be President, became
President, and one of the first two candidates became Vice-Presi-
dent instead.318 A mechanism so liable to malfunction, where
malfunction meant failure to reflect voters’ specific preferences for
President and Vice-President, “cannot be expected,” Clopton
concluded, to “receive the public confidence.”319
311. See id. at 142.
312. 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 119 (1803). 
313. See id. at 490.
314. See id. at 372.
315. See id. at 490-95.
316. See id. at 490-92. 
317. Id. 
318. Id. at 491. 
319. Id. at 492. 
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The scenarios only became more complex and troubling when one
factored in organized partisan competition for the presidency. The
election of 1796 demonstrated that because the second-highest vote
recipient automatically became Vice-President, the President and
Vice-President might often be aligned with different parties.320 A
hostile and scheming Vice-President, however, might use his
constitutional presence in the Senate to build an independent power
base, allying with opposition Senators to thwart the President’s
agenda and create a sort of shadow government.321 Any attempt to
prevent this outcome posed additional problems. Electors who
wanted to ensure that both of their party’s candidates came to office,
and to the specific offices for which the party had chosen them, had
limited options. They could give exactly the same number of votes
to their presidential and vice-presidential candidates, but that
would produce the very deadlock between the top two candidates
that sent the election of 1800 to the House of Representatives.322
Alternatively, electors might toss away a handful of their second-
choice votes on a candidate not from their party who had no chance
of attaining any office. But this route would only be safe if electors
were sure their majority was sufficiently large to prevent the other
party from placing their top-finishing candidate into the vice-
presidency.323 For that matter, the majority party had to be careful
who they nominated for Vice-President on their own ticket because
the minority might cast a number of their second-choice votes for
the majority’s vice-presidential candidate and thereby make that
candidate the President.324 This last scenario is just what Republi-
cans feared Federalists intended to do in 1804, elevating Aaron Burr
over Jefferson.325 
John Quincy Adams inadvertently summarized the mechanical
case for designation when he concluded that “the present mode is
too much like choice by lot.”326 One small mistake by one anonymous
elector could prevent the public’s clear preference for President from
320. See BAILEY, supra note 2, at 197-98. 
321. See id. at 199. 
322. See id. at 198.
323. See id. at 199. 
324. See id.
325. See id. at 199-200; KURODA, supra note 2, at 163. 
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claiming victory.327 The only way to make the college accommodate
specific voter preferences was to designate the ballots.328
Republicans were not content to rest on this argument, however.
They pressed forward to link ballot designation with election by
popular majority. “For, sir,” John Clopton claimed, “in a Govern-
ment constituted as our Government is ... all the constituted
authorities are the agents of the people”—or should be—and that
emphatically included the President.329 It was inexcusable in a
government founded on popular rule that the electoral college could
not accurately register the people’s preferences for President and
Vice-President. “[T]he suffrages given for the election of those
agents ought ever to be a complete expression of the public will,”
Clopton said, “and should ... be directed immediately to those
persons in whom the Electors intend to place confidence, as their
agents, in the particular offices for which the elections are made.”330 
This logic led naturally to the second major issue in debate—the
number of candidates to be referred to the House in the event of a
disputed election. On October 19, just two days after Dawson
introduced his minimalist text, Republicans proposed to reduce the
number of candidates referred from five to some smaller
contingent.331 Representative Clay proposed two;332 the House
committee appointed to consider Dawson’s resolution suggested
three.333 Here too, the case could be made on mechanical grounds.
The original Article II provided for five candidates to be referred,
but those five were candidates for both President and Vice-Presi-
dent; the original text did not recognize any distinction.334 If the
ballots were to be separated, the logic of Article II suggested only
approximately half that number—two or three—should be referred
to the House for election specifically as President, and similarly
with the candidates for Vice-President.335 
327. See id. 
328. See id. at 131-32. 
329. Id. at 490 (emphasis added). 
330. Id. 
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2014] THE TRANSFORMATIVE TWELFTH AMENDMENT 1547
But once again the Republicans quickly carried the argument
onto populist terrain. They contended that reducing the number of
candidates referred to the House was the only way to keep faith
with the great original purpose of the Constitution, popular
sovereignty.336 “[T]he object of the proposed amendment” was the
vindication of “a fundamental principle,” John Clopton argued.337 “It
is the primary, essential, and distinguishing attribute of the
Government, that the will of the people should be done; and that
elections should be according to the will of the people.”338 This was
historical revisionism, but of a revealing kind. In the Republicans’
retelling, the electoral college was never meant to insulate presiden-
tial election from popular choice, but rather to effectuate the public
will.339 That meant election by the House, or any entity other than
the people, ought to be an anomaly. Republican G.W. Campbell
drew the threads of the argument together.340 It was “the duty of
this House ... to secure to the people the benefits of choosing the
President,” he said,341 which implied “resorting to Legislative
interposition only in extraordinary cases.”342 Furthermore, when
legislative intervention was absolutely unavoidable, as in the case
of an electoral deadlock, it was essential to constrain the House’s
discretion as much as possible to the popular will. That is why
reducing the number referred to the House was so critical. “[T]hose
only should be capable of Legislative election who possessed a
strong evidence of enjoying the confidence of the people,” Campbell
explained.343 
The import of these linked arguments for designation and referral
was not lost on Federalists, who quickly understood that Republi-
cans were arguing for a form of majoritarian election. In what was
to become a recurrent theme, Federalists accused the Republicans
of seeking to denigrate the role of small states in presidential
election and promote capture of the Executive by political factions.344
336. See 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 423 (1805).
337. Id.
338. Id. 
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Both were arguments against majoritarian election. Federalist
Gaylord Griswold of New York put the small-state argument
succinctly to the House on October 28.345 “In no other place than on
this floor are the smaller States on an equal footing with the larger
States in the choice of the President of the United States,” he said.346
Separating the presidential and vice-presidential ballots would
make referral to the House less common and thus diminish the
small states’ chances to influence the voting.347 Federalists deployed
the same logic against reducing the number of referred
candidates.348 
The Federalists’ protests on behalf of the small states were
perhaps a bit disingenuous, considering so few Federalists hailed
from small states themselves.349 But Federalists also objected to
majoritarian election on a more principled ground that demon-
strated they understood the systemic change Republicans hoped to
achieve. Federalists argued the Republicans’ amendment would
politicize presidential election and foster political faction.350 “The
present mode of bringing forward candidates” for election, Gaylord
Griswold told the House, “is the least liable to call forth art,
intrigue, and corruption,” precisely because the electoral college
made political coordination severely difficult.351 The Amendment,
however, would facilitate organized political competition with all its
pathologies.352 “[T]he moment the mode pointed out by this resolu-
tion is adopted,” Griswold warned, “the door for intrigue and
corruption is open.”353 “[T]he power of party, influence of office, art,
cunning, intrigue, and corruption” would all be deployed to win the
presidency.354 
This point brought House Federalists to the heart of their case
against the Amendment. The majoritarian fevers it would unleash
and the political competition it would engender would work together
345. See id. at 516-17.
346. Id.
347. See id. 
348. See, e.g., id. at 520-27. 
349. See KURODA, supra note 2, at 110, 130-31. 
350. See 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 518 (1803).
351. Id. at 516, 518. 
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to bind the President to the public in a way the original Constitution
did not provide, and which it was not built to accommodate.355 The
effect would be to elevate the presidency above all other offices in
the government. “But, sir, I could not then suppose, nor do I yet
think,” Benjamin Huger summed up for the Federalists, “that the
salvation and political happiness of the Republic depends so entirely
on the election of any one man as President.”356 Republicans wanted
a representative, political presidency. Federalists were not willing
to go along. 
With the major purposes of the Amendment now in the open, the
House voted on October 28 to adopt the draft by a margin of eighty-
eight to thirty-one, but not before Federalists scored a partial
victory.357 Whether because they found the small-state argument
troubling or out of concern for the House’s institutional preroga-
tives, a key group of Republicans voted to leave the number of
candidates referred to the House in the case of an electoral deadlock
at five rather than three.358
2. Debate in the Senate
It fell to Republicans in the Senate to reforge the majoritarian
link between ballot designation and change in the referral number.
Their effort to do so, however, brought the structural implications
of the Amendment into sharper focus and prompted perhaps the
most insightful argument against the proposed Amendment, one
focused on its implications for the vice-presidency. 
Debate re-opened in the upper chamber on November 23, 1803,
and returned immediately to the referral question.359 The Republi-
cans were ready. When John Quincy Adams suggested that
referring only three candidates to the House would diminish the
small states’ role,360 Republican Samuel Smith of Maryland
promptly dismissed the argument as a distraction.361 He contended
355. See id. at 533.
356. Id. at 518, 533. 
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that differences between small and large states had not been a point
of contention in Congress in the last ten years.362 Moreover, there
was no principled ground on which to support ballot designation but
not a reduction in the House’s electoral role—at least, not if one
accepted that the purpose of ballot designation was to render
presidential selection more public and popular. “[T]he principles
correspond so exactly as to support and enforce each other,” Smith
insisted.363 “It is to place the election in the hands of the people we
wish to designate; it is for the same purpose we wish to keep the
election out of the House of Representatives.”364 Senate Republicans
explicitly and repeatedly drew the connection between reducing the
House’s role and majoritarian election. “[T]he number three in the
amendment ... brought the election two degrees nearer the people,”
James Jackson asserted.365 Senator John Taylor claimed that
anything more than this number would annihilate “the elective
power of the people.”366 But it was William Cocke, Republican of
Tennessee, who put the finest point on the argument: the President,
he said, should be a “man of the people,” and that meant he ought
to be chosen by the people and not the legislature.367
Having closed ranks on the referral question, Senate Republicans
amended the draft on November 29 to refer three candidates to the
House rather than five.368 But their populist-sounding arguments
prompted a fresh Federalist rejoinder. In the House, Federalists had
pointed out that a more truly majoritarian form of presidential
election would entrench political competition for the office, making
the presidency political as a result.369 Senate Federalists now
argued that this same majoritarianism would alter the internal
structure of the executive branch. Stephen Bradley of Vermont
expressed the point most colorfully. Enact this Amendment, he
argued, and the “Vice President would be hawked about at market,
and given as change for votes for the Presidency.”370 Separating the
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ballots for President and Vice-President meant that in the future no
Vice-President could again claim what Thomas Jefferson did in
1796—that he had been the choice for President of a very substan-
tial portion of the electorate. Yet without the political cachet that
votes for President lent, and with precious few constitutional
responsibilities to fall back on, the Vice-President would become a
resolutely secondary political figure.371 
Federalists predicted this would render the executive branch
more internally unified even as it fostered the presidency’s political
character. James Hillhouse of Connecticut developed the argument
for the Federalists by way of an alternative history of the vice-
presidency’s original purpose. In his story, the recent factional
competition for the presidency was the same political temptation the
Framers constructed their system to guard against.372 “The First
Magistratcy of this nation is an object capable of exciting ambition;
and no doubt it would one day or other be sought after by dangerous
and enterprising men,” Hillhouse said.373 That is where the vice-
presidency came in. “It was to place a check upon this ambition that
the Constitution provided for a competitor for the Chief
Magistrate.”374 According to Hillhouse, “once or twice there may be
such an organization of party as will secure for a conspicuous
character the majority of votes.”375 But that contemptible party
spirit would not endure. So long as it did, the original electoral
college made it likely that “men of each of the parties may hold the
two principal offices of the Government” and in this way “be checks
upon each other.”376 
Hillhouse’s history was fictive. In fact, the Framers never
contemplated the political competition for the presidency that
erupted in the late 1790s.377 But this imagined counter-narrative did
draw out two important truths. The first was that the original
electoral college made the executive branch something less than
politically hierarchical because the Vice-President did not necessar-
371. See id. at 89-90. 
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ily owe his station to the President’s good will or to the President’s
party.378 The second was that separating the ballots would destroy
whatever institutional independence the vice-presidency might
claim. Designation would make it very unlikely that the President
and Vice-President would ever be of different parties going forward
and made it certain that the Vice-President would never have been
anyone’s first choice for President. And all this meant the Vice-
President would become clearly the chief executive’s political
subordinate. In the age of parties and political competition, the
executive branch would become unified under the control of a single
party and directed entirely by a single executive officer. 
Federalists forecast profound consequences. The corollary effect
of demoting the Vice-President was to fix the public’s eyes, as well
as political competition, on the presidency. Do this, Federalists
warned, and the presidency would become a populist office. “[B]y the
new amendment, it would be every man to his own book,” Hillhouse
warned, “and every demagogue would be a leader and a
champion.”379 The Republicans, he contended, had been blinded by
“idol worship” of the presidency and now would have the citizens
believe “there is only one man of correct politics in the United
States.”380 He feared a popularly backed President would come to
dominate the entire federal system.381 Samuel White, Federalist of
Delaware, similarly predicted that the Republican’s constitutional
renovation would unleash “the licentiousness of democracy” and
lead ultimately to a quasi-dictatorship.382 “[U]pon this designating
plan the public attention will be entirely engrossed in the election
of the President, in making one great man,” he said.383 Uriah Tracy
wondered “If the gentlemen wish to shake the Constitution to
pieces, if majorities must decide everything, why not go at once to
a simple democracy?”384 
Tellingly, the Republicans made no effort to deny the popular-
izing tendency of their Amendment. Nor did they deny that the
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Amendment would demote the vice-presidency or make the
President a political actor.385 Instead, they defended the right of the
people to control the Executive by public election. The Federalists,
Republicans said, were defending rule by the minority. This was the
Republicans’ closing argument, and with it they indicted not just
their party opponents but the original electoral college too. “Is it
better that the people—a fair majority of the popular princi-
ple—should elect Executive power; or, that a minor faction should
be enabled to embarrass and defeat the judgment and will of this
majority?” John Taylor asked on the final day of Senate debate.386
William Cocke sharpened the refrain: “I say, I do not understand
the principle of minorities governing majorities. The law of the
minority is not the law of the Constitution, and it is not the law for
me.”387 To Federalist charges that the Amendment would destroy
institutional checks within the executive branch or make the
President too great a figure, the Republicans responded with more
populism. “The great check imposed upon Executive power,” John
Taylor said, “was a popular mode of election.”388
This was a different sort of political science than the one the
Framers wrote at Philadelphia. The Republicans’ President was the
choice of the people, the people’s representative, and the means by
which the people controlled the administration of the laws. He was
the creature of political competition and perhaps even the leader of
a political faction. In all events, he was a political actor, empowered
by the people to act on the political principles he announced to
them. For all the Republicans’ protests that the designating
Amendment worked no great alteration in the Constitution’s
frame,389 constitutional renovation was in fact the point and the
result.
The Senate voted to approve the final text of the Amendment on
December 2, 1803, by a margin of twenty-two to ten.390 It com-
manded electors to “name in their ballots the person voted for as
385. Though they did resist a Federalist proposal, made for strategic effect, to eliminate
the vice-presidency altogether. See KURODA, supra note 2, at 134. 
386. 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 180, 183 (1803). 
387. Id. at 151-52. 
388. Id. at 180, 183. 
389. See, e.g., id. at 422-23 (statement of Rep. John Clopton). 
390. KURODA, supra note 2, at 142-43.
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President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-
President”391 and further provided that in the event no candidate
received a majority of the votes for President, the House would
choose from among the “persons having the highest numbers not
exceeding three.”392 After brief debate, the House followed suit six
days later on December 8, 1803, adopting the Senate’s version.393
Kentucky, Virginia, North Carolina, and Ohio ratified before
January.394 Maryland followed on January 7 and Pennsylvania on
January 9.395 After brief but heated debate, Vermont—a small
state—ratified on January 30.396 New York joined the affirmative
tally in February, while New Jersey, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
and Georgia approved the Amendment shortly thereafter.397 By the
time every state legislature had cast its votes, the Amendment
received the approval of all but four states—Delaware and three
states from Federalist New England: Massachusetts, Connecticut,
and New Hampshire.398 Secretary of State James Madison pro-
claimed the text adopted as the Twelfth Amendment to the United
States Constitution on September 25, 1804, just in time for the
presidential election.399
B. Changing Structure: What the Twelfth Amendment Did
Constitutional text creates constitutional structure—or changes
it, and that is what the Twelfth Amendment did. By changing the
mode of executive election, the Amendment facilitated and indeed
entrenched organized political competition for the presidency. This
constitutional alteration in turn worked at least two additional
structural changes: It conferred new warrants for political action on
391. U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
392. Id. 
393. See KURODA, supra note 2, at 148, 151. In this final version, vice-presidential election
shifted to the Senate. See id. at 146, 148-49. 
394. Id. at 156. 
395. Id. at 156-57. 
396. Id. at 158-59. 
397. Id. at 159-60. 
398. See House, supra note 2, at 58, 60-61. In New Hampshire, the legislature actually
supported the Amendment. But the New Hampshire governor claimed to have a say in the
state’s decision and vetoed the Amendment. The legislature protested, but lacked the votes
to overturn a veto. New Hampshire was thus considered not to have ratified. See id. at 60-61. 
399. Id. at 61.
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the President. And it unified the executive branch internally by
removing the Vice-President as a possible political rival. To describe
these alterations is to describe the rise of the political presidency.
Together, the changes, and the presidency they created, amounted
to a structural realignment of the federal system.
1. Entrenching Political Competition
Before the late 1790s, centrally coordinated, national competition
for the executive office was unheard of and largely unimagined.
After the Twelfth Amendment, it became commonplace. Directing
electors to designate their ballots for President and Vice-President
solved the problem of elector coordination posed by the original
Article II. With electors casting one vote specifically for a presiden-
tial candidate and one for a vice-presidential aspirant, there would
be no more guessing as to how many electoral votes a given
candidate had at any one time, the question that had so confounded
partisans in 1800.400 Eliminating this information deficit meant
parties would now be able to run presidential and vice-presidential
candidates effectively on a single ticket.401 State electors only
needed to pledge their support to a given ticket before being
selected. Provided they did, the electoral vote could be contested and
won with no need for electors to meet in person or confer.402
The Amendment did not require pledged electors nor party
tickets, but it made these practices effective mechanisms for
capturing the presidency and powerfully encouraged parties to
organize competition in this way. If the original Article II had made
it difficult to win an electoral majority by coordinated campaigning,
the Twelfth Amendment made it all but impossible to win without
it.403 Parties began nominating candidate tickets in 1796, when the
parties’ respective congressional caucuses chose the candidates.
That means of selection would last until 1824, to be replaced by
nominating conventions, but the institution of the party ticket
endured.404 Meanwhile, the practice of pledged partisan electors
400. See supra Part III.A.
401. See supra Part III.
402. See BAILEY, supra note 2, at 221. 
403. CEASER, supra note 89, at 105. 
404. Id. at 121-27.
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became similarly entrenched. “[T]he people do not elect a person for
an elector who, they know, does not intend to vote for a particular
person as President,” Congressman Samuel Mitchell remarked in
1802.405 In time, multiple states would require their electors to
pledge support to a particular candidate.406
The Amendment worked to entrench organized competition in
another way. The new text reduced the number of electoral-college
ballots cast for President by half and actually made it more likely
that the top-finishing candidate would not gain an outright electoral
majority unless political parties actively concentrated national
support behind two or three leading contenders.407 The Amendment
thus made political parties central to achieving one of its primary
objectives, keeping election out of the House of Representatives.408
As political scientist James Ceaser has observed, “[I]f parties began
to disintegrate, the Twelfth Amendment ... provided a powerful new
justification for recreating them.”409 This was perhaps an ironic
result given that Republicans, for all their enthusiasm regarding
political competition, remained ambivalent on the question of
political parties as permanent institutions. A good many Republi-
cans hoped the parties would in due course pass away.410 But the
Twelfth Amendment made this most unlikely. Instead, it provided
powerful incentives for party organization and made the presidency
both the subject and beneficiary of ongoing, organized political
competition. 
2. Warranting Political Action
That competition conferred on the Executive something the office
had not enjoyed before: democratic warrants for political action,
along with democratic incentives to act. Political competition had a
democratizing effect. Whereas only five states chose their electors
by popular vote in 1800, over half did by 1816, and all but one by
405. 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 1289-90 (1802). 
406.  Akhil Reed Amar & Vik Amar, President Quayle?, 78 VA. L. REV. 913, 925 n.47 (1992). 
407. CEASER, supra note 89, at 105. 
408. Id. 
409. Id. at 106. 
410. Id. at 105-06, 124-27; WILENTZ, supra note 185, at 50.
2014] THE TRANSFORMATIVE TWELFTH AMENDMENT 1557
1828.411 Still, even in 1804, the Twelfth Amendment fostered public-
oriented political electioneering that linked the presidency to the
populace in a way it had not been previously. The shift in presiden-
tial behavior that this newfound representative status authorized
was observable almost immediately in Jefferson’s presidency. To be
sure, some of Jefferson’s political practices as President predated
the adoption of the Twelfth Amendment. Still, it was Jefferson’s
view of the Executive as a representative office that informed his
new praxis, and he and the Republicans would point to the Twelfth
Amendment as making their vision constitutional.412
Whereas Washington and Adams had studiously avoided overly
political statements, especially in their inaugural addresses,413
Jefferson made them forthrightly, even boldly.414 He claimed to
speak as a political leader.415 He also claimed to speak as a policy
leader. Neither Washington nor Adams used their annual messages
to Congress to argue the merits of specific pieces of legislation, and
neither attempted to influence directly the deliberations in Con-
gress.416 Jefferson did both.417 In fact, Jefferson embraced political
leadership of Congress of a kind that only Hamilton had ventured
to try; Jefferson, however, did so as President, not as a cabinet
secretary.418 Jefferson began by deputizing a member of the
Republican House caucus to act as his spokesman in that body.419
This floor leader was a “presidential agent[ ], appointed by the
executive, and dismissed at his pleasure.”420 Jefferson routinely
communicated his wishes to the caucus, articulated legislative
priorities, and suggested draft legislation.421 His influence was so
great that Federalist Timothy Pickering could remark, with only
modest overstatement, that Jefferson “secretly dictates every
measure which is seriously proposed and supported.”422 His practice
411. CEASER, supra note 89, at 20, 103 n.22. 
412. BAILEY, supra note 2, at 201-11. 
413. See FIRST PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGES 19-29 (George N. Otey ed., 2009). 
414. BAILEY, supra note 2, at 213-15.
415. Id.
416. WHITE, supra note 57, at 59. 
417. WHITE, supra note 236, at 32. 
418. Id. at 551.
419. Id. at 48-51. 
420. HARLOW, supra note 196, at 177.
421. WHITE, supra note 236, at 49-53.
422. Id. at 35. Buttressing Pickering’s view, historian Sean Wilentz has concluded that
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would set the pattern for Presidents to come.423 Future Executives
would be more or less aggressive than Jefferson in establishing a
policy agenda and advocating its passage,424 but all would enjoy the
democratic authority to do so.425 
Jefferson also exerted greater control than his predecessors over
the executive branch.426 Washington had filled cabinet seats and
other official posts on the basis of competence, character and
reputation,427 but Jefferson expressly included political allegiance
as a criterion for appointment and dismissal.428 Upon assuming
office, he set about determinedly changing the complexion of the
executive branch from a Federalist to a Republican hue by filling
the 316 offices subject to his appointment power with Republican
loyalists.429 When asked to justify his departure from the earlier,
non-partisan norm of appointment, Jefferson offered an essentially
populist rejoinder. The “public sentiment [had] at length declared
itself” in favor of the Republican political program through the
medium of presidential election, he said.430 “Is it political intoler-
ance” for Republicans thus “to claim a proportionate share in the
direction of public affairs?”431 Jefferson portrayed political control of
the executive branch as the means by which the people, acting
through a political President, implemented the principles they
preferred.432 And once again, the democratic warrant of public
approval would make the same arguments available to all future
Presidents. Not surprisingly, the vast majority has followed
Jefferson’s practice.433
“until the abandonment of the embargo in 1809, not a single important piece of Jeffersonian
legislation failed to pass Congress.” WILENTZ, supra note 185, at 137. 
423. See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 236, at 51-52. 
424. Id. at 39. 
425. STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE 17-32 (1993). 
426. WHITE, supra note 236, at 551. 
427. WHITE, supra note 57, at 257-59. This was a prescription Adams followed in principle,
if not always in practice. Id. at 267-68, 277-80. 
428. BAILEY, supra note 2, at 155, 158. 
429. SKOWRONEK, supra note 425, at 72. 
430. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Elias Shipman and Others (July 12, 1801), in 9 THE
WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 272 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1905).
431. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
432. BAILEY, supra note 2, at 158-60. 
433. SKOWRONEK, supra note 425, at 17-32. 
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If public approval communicated political authority to act, it also
imposed political consequences for the actions Presidents took, and
this made presidential election a catalytic event. A more public form
of election meant that any and all presidential action would now be
subject to popular judgment, just as Congress’s actions were. But
the President’s institutional prominence and head of state status
made him specially accountable for his performance and for the
performance of the federal government as a whole. In the words of
political scientist Stephen Skowronek, the presidential office
“focuses the eyes and draws out the attachments of the people.”434
The President could be blamed for the operation of the government
in a way no individual congressman could, precisely because he
appeared responsible in a way no individual congressman did. As
the ever-perceptive Alexis de Tocqueville observed, the Executive’s
“honor, property, liberty, and life stand as constant guarantees to
the people that he will make good use of his power.”435 Presidential
elections became a referendum on the state of the union. 
Jefferson anticipated that the election of the Executive would
come to work in just this manner. Presidential terms, he told a
correspondent in 1805, were effectively eight years in length, “with
a power to remove at the end of the first four” should the people
decide, after assessing the President’s performance, that he was
“doing wrong.”436 Presidential election, in other words, was a form
of performance review. In this way, public-style election spurred the
President not just to good conduct, but to affirmative action, and not
just to execute the policies Congress adopted, but to pursue his own
agenda.437
3. Unifying the Executive
In addition to conveying new warrants for political leadership, the
Amendment granted the President a freer hand in exercising
political power by reducing the Vice-President to a decidedly
434. Id. at 20. 
435. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 136 (Arthur Goldhammer trans.,
Penguin 2004) (1835). 
436. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Taylor (Jan. 6, 1805), in 10 THE WORKS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 125, supra note 430. 
437. See SKOWRONEK, supra note 425, at 26, 37, 41, 49. 
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subordinate status.438 The institutional consequences were signifi-
cant. The Executive might well have become politicized, after all,
without becoming politically homogeneous. Congress was a political
institution, and it was anything but homogeneous: different
members elected by different constituencies at different times
guaranteed robust political diversity.439 And although the Constitu-
tion vested the executive power in a single President, the document
created two elective executive offices.440 This structure made it
entirely possible, as Federalist congressmen in 1803 hoped, that the
Vice-President would emerge as a political rival to the chief
executive.441 There is in fact ample precedent for such a develop-
ment. Nearly every state in the American union operates with a
politically heterogeneous executive,442 as indeed do most other
nations that employ a presidentialist system.443 A politically
independent Vice-President was a very real possibility, and might
have significantly altered the practice of executive administration.444 
But even as it politicized the executive branch, the Twelfth
Amendment ruled political heterogeneity out. Separating the ballots
for President and Vice-President meant that no future Vice-
President would ever be able to claim that he was the choice for
President of a significant segment of the public.445 Nor would he
ever likely again be the leader of a major political faction outside the
President’s party.446 Although in theory electors might vote for a
presidential candidate from one party and a vice-presidential
candidate from another, the new political realities the Twelfth
Amendment helped create made such ticket splitting improbable.447
Parties placed their candidates before the public (or the state
legislature) as pairs. Some states in the early 1800s listed the
438. See supra notes 370-85 and accompanying text.
439. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3. 
440. U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 3.
441. 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 89-90 (1803) (statement of Sen. James Hillhouse). 
442. Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, The Unbundled Executive, 75 U. CHI. L. REV.
1385, 1399-1401 (2008); Fontana, supra note 2, at 1417-18. 
443. See Fontana, supra note 2, at 1417-19. 
444. Id. at 1423-25. 
445. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 168.
446. See Amar & Amar, supra note 406, at 923-24 (describing the development of the single
party ticket for President and Vice-President).
447. Though a few electors ticket split through the early 1800s. See id. at 922-23. 
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candidates as a pair on the ballot, as all do today,448 and electors
typically pledged themselves to party tickets. In addition, a party
had every incentive to nominate its most attractive and well-known
candidate for President rather than for Vice-President.449 This
practice made it unlikely that vice-presidential candidates would be
sufficiently popular to win election on their own, without party
backing. In turn, it was difficult for vice-presidential candidates to
establish a compelling identity apart from the party apparatus.450 
Louis Clinton Hatch once famously remarked that John Calhoun
was “the only American statesman of the first or second rank who
held the Vice-Presidency in the century between its occupancy by
Jefferson and Roosevelt.”451 That was because the Twelfth Amend-
ment made the vice-presidency a tertiary office, and the President
the unrivaled political leader of the executive branch.
*  *  *
One might legitimately wonder about the counterfactual
question:452 Was the Twelfth Amendment truly necessary to the
emergence of the political presidency? Or would this change in the
Executive have happened anyway? Well before the adoption of the
Twelfth Amendment the presidency was having political effect.
Hamilton demonstrated that executive officers could influence the
legislature and craft policy,453 and Washington showed that the
President could manage foreign affairs largely on his own.454 The
structure of Article II made these things possible insofar as it
uniquely fitted the Executive to receive and exercise power.455 But
these early practices revealed only the political potential of the
presidency; they showed that the Executive’s actions carried
448. Id. at 942-43 & n.85. 
449. Fontana, supra note 2, at 1428-29. 
450. Id. at 1428. 
451. LOUIS CLINTON HATCH, A HISTORY OF THE VICE-PRESIDENCY OF THE UNITED STATES
71 (Earl L. Shoup ed., 1934). 
452. See generally Niall Ferguson, Virtual History: Towards a “Chaotic” Theory of the Past,
in VIRTUAL HISTORY: ALTERNATIVES AND COUNTERFACTUALS 1, 1-90 (Niall Ferguson ed., 1997)
(describing “counterfactual” history). 
453. See supra Part III.A.
454. See supra notes 171-75 and accompanying text.
455. See Black, supra note 207, at 17; see also discussion supra Part III.A.
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political implications. They did not make the presidency a political
office. For that, the Executive required some sort of democratic
sanction. And this is what the Twelfth Amendment conferred. 
It is entirely possible, of course, that political actors might have
found some other way to confer democratic warrant on the presi-
dency apart from the particular changes to presidential election the
Twelfth Amendment made. But in any scenario, some reform of the
electoral college was essential. If the President was to be connected
to the people, and acquire democratic warrants for political action,
the non-public election specified by the 1787 Constitution had to
change. This is what the Twelfth Amendment did. 
None of this is to argue that Twelfth Amendment led ineluctably
to what we now call the “modern presidency.” The hyperkinetic chief
executive familiar to Americans of the twenty-first century is the
product of multiple complex and interlocking historical events, of
which the Twelfth Amendment is only one. But if the Twelfth
Amendment’s direct consequences were more limited, they were
transformative nonetheless. The Amendment made the President
a political actor. It is time to consider what that portends for
constitutional law. 
IV. STRUCTURAL REASONING ABOUT THE EXECUTIVE
Structural changes have interpretive consequences. The Twelfth
Amendment changed the available uses of the President’s executive
power by conferring on the office political authority and altering its
relationship to Congress. And this in turn may affect our under-
standing of executive power. The Twelfth Amendment’s renovations
carry potential import for a number of separation of powers
controversies. Here I focus principally on a paradigmatic one: the
President’s authority to remove executive branch officers. By
constitutionalizing the political presidency, the Twelfth Amendment
implies that the President may rightfully claim political control over
the executive branch. To exercise political control, he must be able
to remove subordinate policy-making officers. This is the argument
that can break the removal-debate logjam, and this Part explains it
in some detail. 
Structural arguments of the kind I make here have recently
become controversial. And so I begin with a brief word about what
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sort of structural reasoning I have in mind, and then offer a brief
explanation as to why this type of structural reasoning does not run
afoul of John Manning’s recent and well-taken critique of purposiv-
ist structural interpretation. These necessary clarifications made,
I turn to apply structural reasoning to the removal debate. 
A. Brief Defense of Structural Reasoning
Interpretation by structural inference is one of the most venera-
ble methods of constitutional reasoning in American law.456 Chief
Justice John Marshall was its earliest practitioner and perhaps its
most skillful.457 But it was Charles Black who gave the method its
modern canonical expression.458 In distinction from precedent-based
reasoning and textual analysis, Black defined structural interpreta-
tion as a “method of inference from the structures and relationships
created by the constitution in all its parts or in some principal
part.”459 The idea was to ask not only what a specific text meant in
itself but also what relationship that text bore to other texts, and
what relationships those texts together created among the various
branches and entities of government.460 
That last part is central because while it is surely possible to use
structural reasoning to analyze the relationship between various
clauses in the Constitution in order to fix the meaning of an
ambiguous passage,461 the method’s core application involves more.
Structural reasoning can and should encompass the relationships
between the branches and offices of government that the Constitu-
tion creates, as well as those branches’ and offices’ internal composi-
tions.462 Put another way, the structure we care about should
456. John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
399, 440-43 (2010). 
457. Id. at 441 n.206.
458. John Harrison, Review of Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law, 89 VA.
L. REV. 1779, 1779-80 (2003) (reviewing CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATION-
SHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969)). 
459. BLACK, supra note 458, at 7. 
460. Black, supra note 207, at 16-17. 
461. Manning, supra note 456, at 439-40; see also Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112
HARV. L. REV. 747, 791-95 (1999). 
462. See Amar, supra note 461, at 790 (“[T]he most typical forms of structural argument
focus not on the words of the Constitution, but rather on the institutional arrangements
implied or summoned into existence by the document—the relationship between the
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include not just grammatical structure but political structure too.
Charles Black said as much when he famously argued that the
Supreme Court ought to have premised its judgment in Carrington
v. Rash463 on a political structure argument that emphasized
political supremacy of the federal government over the state
governments.464 Chief Justice Marshall relied on the same logic of
political structure to decide McCulloch v. Maryland.465 And the
modern Supreme Court reasoned from political structure to reach
the anti-commandeering principle announced in Printz v. United
States.466
Thus it is quite relevant for the interpretation of the executive
Vesting Clause in Article II, Section 1, that the Twelfth Amendment
confers on the President a democratic warrant to act politically. This
tells us that whatever else it is, the President’s “executive power”
after 1804 includes a political dimension. That is, the business of
administering the laws includes political administration. That fact
should weigh heavily when we consider, for example, what the
President must be able to do and what sort of control over the
executive branch he must be able to exercise in order to “take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed.”467 It is similarly relevant that
the Twelfth Amendment empowered the President to act as a
policymaker vis-à-vis Congress, and that as it did so, it removed the
Vice-President as an internal political rival, making the Executive
as a whole politically homogeneous.468 These facts too tell us
something about what “executive power” means. I will have more to
say on all of this momentarily, but the point now is that political
structure matters. That is my first claim.
My second claim is that reasoning from the political structure
created by the Constitution’s text does not constitute an objection-
able form of generality shifting. John Manning has recently pointed
out that some of the Supreme Court’s structural reasoning in its
Presidency and the Congress, or the balance between the House and the Senate.”).
463. The main issue of the case was whether Texas could forbid active-duty members of the
U.S. military from establishing residency to vote in the state. 380 U.S. 89, 89-90 (1965). 
464. See BLACK, supra note 458, at 8, 11-12. 
465. 17 U.S. (4 Wheaton) 316, 428 (1819); see BLACK, supra note 458, at 13-15; see also
AMAR, supra note 2, at 22-23. 
466. 521 U.S. 898, 918-20 (1997). I am indebted to Justice Scalia for this point. 
467. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
468. See supra Part III.
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federalism and separation of powers jurisprudence looks suspi-
ciously like the sort of purposivism the Court has rejected as a
method of statutory interpretation.469 In the statutory context, the
Court has been keen to emphasize in recent years that no law
pursues its ends at all costs, and that the specific means of imple-
mentation a statute’s drafters select must therefore not be gainsaid
by reference to broader statutory purpose.470 Statutory directives
represent bargained-for legislative compromises; to trump them by
reference to purpose is to shift statutory meaning to a level of
generality higher than and different from what the drafters agreed
upon. Manning argues persuasively that the Court’s process-based
critique of generality shifting for statutory interpretation should
apply to constitutional interpretation also.471 
Interpretive inferences based on political structure, however,
need not constitute generality shifting of this sort. Indeed, Manning
contends that the “most promising[ ] way to lend determinacy to the
Vesting Clauses is to read them in the light of surrounding constitu-
tional terms.”472 I would add that the Article II Vesting Clause
should be read in light of not only surrounding terms but also the
political structures that those terms, and the Constitution as a
whole, create. To make this move from semantic structure to
political structure is not to fall back into purposivism. Put another
way, to interpret “executive power” by reference to the structural
changes the Twelfth Amendment made to the executive branch
internally and the new structural relationship it created between
that branch and Congress is not to announce an abstract value, like
federalism or separation of powers, that stands free of any particu-
lar constitutional provision.473 Rather, it is to allow the political and
469. See Manning, supra note 456, at 440-43; John F. Manning, Federalism and the
Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2004-08 (2009)
[hereinafter Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem]; John F. Manning, Separation
of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 1942-46 (2011) [hereinafter
Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation]. 
470. See, e.g., MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 512 U.S. 218, 231 n.4 (1994) (“[The
Court is] bound, not only by the ultimate purposes Congress has selected, but by the means
it has deemed appropriate, and prescribed, for the pursuit of those purposes”); Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 374 (1986) (same). 
471. See, e.g., Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem, supra note 469, at 2004-06;
Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, supra note 469, at 1946-49. 
472. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, supra note 469, at 2034. 
473. Manning, supra note 456, at 440.
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institutional implications of one very specific constitutional
provision, the text of the Twelfth Amendment, to inform the mean-
ing of other specific provisions: the Article II, Section 1 Vesting
Clause and the presidential powers enumerated in Sections 2 and
3.474 To that task of structural reasoning, I now turn.
B. Application: The Removal Power
The removal debate is one badly in need of structural argument.
After nearly three decades of renewed and impassioned scholarly
attention, the debate is deadlocked along now familiar lines. On the
one side are advocates of what has been styled the “unitary Execu-
tive,” who contend that as a matter of original meaning, the
Constitution gives “all of the executive power to one, and only one,
person: the president of the United States.”475 These “unitarians,” as
they are sometimes called, believe the executive power emphatically
includes the authority to remove subordinate executive officers, a
contention they support by reference to the Constitution’s Article II
Vesting Clause,476 as well as to the historical meaning of executive
power and early federal practice.477 On the other side stand the
skeptics, who argue variously that the Constitution’s textual silence
as to presidential removal is authoritative;478 that the Article II
Vesting Clause conveys no substantive authority on the President
apart from those powers listed in Sections 2 and 3 (which do not
include removal);479 that the historical meaning of executive power
is indeterminate or contrary to the unitarian position;480 that the
474. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918-22 (1997) (stating that the Commerce
Clause cannot be interpreted to permit the federal government to commandeer state officials
to implement its directives because to do so would upset the structural division between
federal and state sovereigns). 
475. See CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 62, at 3. 
476. U.S. CONST. art. II § 1. 
477. See, e.g., CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 62, at 4-9; see also CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND
LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION, 154-160 (1991); Calabresi & Prakash, supra note
166, at 599; Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 166, at 1161; Currie, supra note 223, at 195-202.
478. A. Michael Froomkin, The Imperial Presidency's New Vestments, 88 NW. U. L. REV.
1346, 1373 (1994).
479. Flaherty, supra note 137, at 1789; Froomkin, supra note 478, at 1365. 
480. Flaherty, supra note 137, at 1790; Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 167, at 12; Stephen
Skowronek, The Conservative Insurgency and Presidential Power: A Developmental Perspective
on the Unitary Executive, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2070, 2078 (2009). 
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First Congress actually separated substantial portions of the admin-
istration from presidential control,481 never endorsing presidential
removal as a constitutional matter;482 and that a bevy of normative
considerations counsel against vesting a power to remove in the
President.483 
The stalemate is entrenched, due largely to the profound
ambiguity of Article II’s text and history. Advocates of presidential
removal typically rest their claims on the Vesting Clause,484 and
they have made a strong case that it does more than merely
designate the identity of the actor who will exercise the powers
enumerated in Sections 2 and 3, but rather conveys some independ-
ent substantive authority to administer the laws.485 But “the
executive power” mentioned in the Clause is undefined. As a
consequence, insisting that the President alone has authority to
remove any officer performing executive responsibilities because
the Constitution gives all of the executive power to the President
does not get one very far.486 It only begs the question: what does
481. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 167, at 30-33. 
482. Edward S. Corwin, Tenure of Office and the Removal Power Under the Constitution,
27 COLUM. L. REV. 353, 360-63 (1927). 
483. See Flaherty, supra note 137, at 1740; Froomkin, supra note 478, at 1374. 
484. See, e.g., Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 166, at 570-81. The Supreme Court and
various scholars have named other textual candidates. In the seminal Myers v. United States,
Chief Justice William Howard Taft suggested the President’s authority to remove executive
subordinates was founded on his obligation to “take Care the Laws be faithfully executed.”
272 U.S. 52, 122 (1926). In 1789, James Madison argued that the power to remove was
concomitant with the power to appoint, which Article II conferred on the President. See 11
DEBATES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 868 (Charlene Bangs Bickford et al. eds., 1992).
But neither of these is particularly plausible as a source of removal authority. The Faithful
Execution Clause imposes a duty, rather than conferring power. See Saikrishna Prakash,
Removal and Tenure in Office, 92 VA. L. REV. 1779, 1836-37 (2006). And our Constitution
clearly does not make the power to remove incident to the power to appoint. Id. at 1834. As
Prakash points out, “numerous entities select various federal officials, with apparently few
supposing that the selectors may remove the selected.” Id. For instance, the Electoral College
voters may not remove a President; “the people of a congressional district may not recall their
representative”; and governors who can “appoint” replacement Senators under Article I,
Section 3 have no power to remove them. Id. Prakash also persuasively shows that the
appointment-based removal argument relies on assumptions about agency relationships
between the President and other officials not warranted in the federal system. Id. at 1834-37. 
485. See Calabresi, supra note 166, at 1388; Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 166, at 570-
81 (1994); Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 166, at 1178. For the contrary view, see Curtis A.
Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH.
L. REV. 545, 551 (2004); Froomkin, supra note 478, at 1363.
486. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 166, at 595-96. Calabresi and Prakash do not rest
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“executive power” include? Some unitarians look to the historical
practice of the British Crown for the answer and argue that because
the Crown held the authority to remove executive officers at will or,
perhaps more precisely, to designate the length and type of tenure
during which these officers would hold their posts,487 the Article II
“executive power” can be assumed to include the same.488 Yet as
with every argument that looks to English practice as a source of
background meaning, this claim presumes that revolutionary-era
Americans regarded the English experience as normative. They
likely did not—at least, not uniformly.489
Alternatively, some advocates of removal have pointed to the
decision of the First Congress to include in the bill establishing the
Department of Foreign Affairs language acknowledging the right of
the President to remove the department’s secretary.490 This is the
so-called Decision of 1789.491 But fixing the Decision’s meaning is a
notoriously complicated endeavor, not least because what is called
“the Decision” spans multiple cycles of voting and debate across both
Houses.492 Even the most spirited proponents of this approach must
on this assertion, but go on to develop an account of executive power and presidential
responsibility based on text and history. Id. at 596-97.
487. See Prakash, supra note 484, at 1820.
488. See YOO, supra note 162, at 45, 65. 
489. See Bailey, supra note 153, at 455; Jack N. Rakove, Joe the Ploughman Reads the
Constitution, or, The Poverty of Public Meaning Originalism, 48 U. SAN DIEGO L. REV. 575,
592-93 (2011). The history of the framing period casts considerable doubt on the idea that the
American constitution makers looked to the British experience as a ready model. Id. at 592-
93. Historians emphasize that the political and military revolution that began in the mid-
1770s was accompanied by an intellectual cataclysm, one that swept away political concepts
inherited from the common law in favor of newly forged American variants. Id. at 589.
Evidence for how the framers did or did not borrow from the British tradition of royal removal
is thin. The Philadelphia debates are silent on this question, as on the content of executive
power more generally. Id. at 591-92. The practices of the revolutionary era states are similarly
ambiguous: four state constitutions in the revolutionary period referenced some sort of
removal power, but three of the four entrusted it to the state executive acting with a council.
Prakash, supra note 484, at 1822. Only in Maryland could the governor alone suspend or
remove civil officers. Id. Other state constitutions did not address the subject. Id. at 1822-23.
490. CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 62, at 35.
491. See id. at 10-36; Prakash, supra note 484, at 1827-30. See generally Saikrishna
Prakash, New Light on the Decision of 1789, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1021 (2006) (providing a
general discussion of the Decision of 1789). Chief Justice William Howard Taft made the same
argument in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 174-75 (1926).
492. To simplify, the key question is what motivated a group of fifteen Representatives who
voted against removing language from one version of the bill that explicitly grounded the
President’s removal authority in a delegation from Congress, only to vote in favor of the final
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rely on inferences from scattered statements by the key voters and
speculation as to those voters’ true motives.493 In the end, it appears
impossible to say with any certainty whether the determinative
House members believed the Constitution vested the power of
removal in the President.494 
The removal debate is due for a structural turn. Tellingly,
unitarian scholars’ most powerful point is less an argument from
Article II’s text and history than an intuition. The intuition is that
if the President is in charge of the executive branch, “[i]t would
make little sense to force the President to deal with officers who
fundamentally disagree with his administrative or political philoso-
phy.”495 That idea turns on a certain unacknowledged conception of
what presidential administration is about. To be specific: The
unitarian position assumes presidential administration would be
impossible, or nearly so, if the President were not able to maintain
political control over the executive branch. Beneath that assumption
rests a further one: that what the President does is political, that he
is in fact a political actor. As it turns out, the best case for a
presidential power of removal comes from the political character the
Twelfth Amendment conferred on the presidency.
1. The Core Argument
The critical question for determining whether the President has
constitutional power to remove executive officials is: What does it
mean to administer the laws? This is where the Twelfth Amend-
ment proves enlightening. The structural changes Amendment
version that acknowledged the President’s right to remove the Foreign Affairs Secretary but
without specifying the source of that authority. The consensus view is that this faction of
fifteen believed the Constitution did not unambiguously confer removal authority on the
President, but thought the authority could be delegated by act of Congress under the
Necessary and Proper Clause. This view was first articulated by Justice Louis Brandeis in
dissent in Myers, 272 U.S. at 285 & n.74 (Brandeis, J., dissenting), and since reiterated by
Edward Corwin, see Corwin, supra note 482, at 361-62; 1 CORWIN ON THE CONSTITUTION 332
(Richard Loss ed., 1981), and David Currie, Currie, supra note 1, at 41 & n.240, among others,
see Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 485, at 662. For a detailed discussion of this voting
sequence, see Prakash, supra note 491, at 1028-33; see also Corwin, supra note 482, at 360-70. 
493. Prakash, supra note 491, at 1052-53, 1060. 
494. Id. at 1060-61, 1072-73. For a similar conclusion, see Manning, Separation of Powers
as Ordinary Interpretation, supra note 469, at 2030-32 & nn. 452-53. 
495. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 166, at 598. 
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made supply definition to the task of law administration and by
extension, definition to the content of executive power.496 Specifi-
cally, the Twelfth Amendment tells us that law administration now
has political implications, that it is in fact a political task because
the presidency is now a political office.497 By subjecting the Execu-
tive to organized political competition, and by connecting it to
popular majorities,498 the Twelfth Amendment authorizes presiden-
tial administration according to political principles and for the
purpose of advancing a political agenda.499 
The President’s post-Twelfth Amendment political role has
significant institutional implications. Simply put, in order to impose
his political principles on the administration of the laws, the
President must be able to control those executive branch subordi-
nates who occupy policy-making positions. Political control is
necessary to political administration. If policy-making officials in
the executive branch were insulated from the direct management of
the President in the vein Alexander Hamilton imagined, for
instance with a more or less permanent civil service devising policy
and administering the government as figurehead chief executives
came and went,500 the President would be institutionally unable to
conform the enforcement of the law to his political priorities. The
President as political administrator thus implies a reasonably close
integration of the Executive and the administration. 
This integration would be defeated should the President be
unable to remove policy-making subordinates who refuse to comply
with his wishes. This point is the true, if unacknowledged, heart of
Chief Justice Taft’s famous defense of presidential removal power
in Myers v. United States.501 After holding that “[t]he vesting of
the executive power in the President was essentially a grant of the
power to execute the laws,”502 Taft went on to note that the
President exercises the enforcement authority with the help of
numerous subordinates.503 The President must be able to control
496. See supra Part III.
497. See id.
498. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
499. See supra Part III.
500. See BAILEY, supra note 2, at 170; see also supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
501. 272 U.S. 52, 53 (1926). 
502. Id. at 117. 
503. Id. (“[T]he President alone and unaided could not execute the laws. He must execute
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those subordinates in order to control the administration. “[T]o
hold otherwise [and permit the Senate a negative on removals]
would make it impossible for the President, in case of political or
other difference with the Senate or Congress, to take care that the
laws be faithfully executed.”504 
Though he barely acknowledged it, Taft’s logic turned on the
political dimensions of presidential law enforcement. If the Presi-
dent’s responsibility were merely to administer laws Congress wrote
without regard to political considerations or policy, then there would
be nothing untoward in Congress insulating executive officials,
including those with appreciable authority like cabinet secretaries,
from direct presidential control.505 The President’s job, after all,
would be to administer the policy Congress devised. But Taft’s
reasoning hinged on the claim that Congress is not the only
policymaker in the federal government. “The extent of the political
responsibility thrust upon the President” is vast, Taft contended.506
And it was the President’s right to “determin[e] the national public
interest and [to] direct[ ] the action to be taken by his executive
subordinates to protect it.”507 The President was entitled to make
policy judgments of his own, which meant that in cases of political
disagreement with the Senate, or Congress more generally, he must
be able to pursue his own political principles and not have Con-
gress’s forced upon him.508 James Madison invoked exactly this logic
in 1834 when he defended Andrew Jackson’s exercise of the removal
power. If the Senate had a share in the power to remove, Madison
reasoned, it could “force on the Executive Department a continuance
in office, even of Cabinet officers, notwithstanding a change from a
personal [and] political harmony with the President, to a state of
open hostility towards him.”509 Taft and Madison’s argument
them by the assistance of subordinates.”). 
504. Id. at 164 (emphasis added). 
505. Bradley & Flaherty, supra note 485, at 546; Froomkin, supra note 478, at 1348-49; see
also Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 167, at 5-11. 
506. Myers, 272 U.S. at 133. 
507. Id. at 134. 
508. Id. at 164. 
509. Letter from James Madison to John Patton (Mar. 24, 1834), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON, 1819-1836, at 534-36 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910). 
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assumed the President’s political authority without inquiring as to
its source. The Twelfth Amendment is that source.510
The argument can be extended by reference to changes the
Amendment made to the internal composition of the Executive
Branch. The text eliminated the Vice-President as an independent
political authority and unified the executive department under the
political direction of the President.511 Permitting Congress to place
executive officers outside presidential control would reverse this
structural change and reintroduce political heterogeneity to the
Executive. This political diversification is likely what unitarians
have in mind when they argue that denying the President the power
to remove would render the Executive less unitary, even though it
would still leave the President as the single head of the executive
branch.512 Again, the argument is a structural one about political
control and is best made from the Twelfth Amendment. 
The Amendment provides at least one other reason to conclude
that the President has the constitutional authority to remove policy-
making executive officials. By virtue of the changes to presidential
election, the presidency is now a representative office, and the Pres-
ident’s control over the administration is one powerful means by
which the people exert control over their government.513 This reason
is all the more compelling in an age when administration accounts
for the vast majority of day-to-day governance. Perhaps not
surprisingly, it was the populist Jefferson’s central justification for
presidential control of subordinate officers.514 The “will of the
nation,” he contended, “calls for an administration of government
according with the opinions of those elected,” and that meant the
President needed authority to remove those persons from whom he
“could scarcely expect ... a cordial co-operation [sic].”515
510. Lessig and Sunstein reach a similar conclusion on atextual grounds. The reasoning
given here supplies firmer ground than their merely functional and consequentialist logic. See
Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 167, at 97-98.
511. See supra notes 370-85 and accompanying text.
512. See CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 62, at 4; Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 166, at
661-65; Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 166, at 1165-66. 
513. BAILEY, supra note 2, at 152.
514. Id. at 152-55. 
515. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Elias Shipman, in 9 THE WORKS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON, supra note 430, at 270; see also BAILEY, supra note 2, at 163-64. 
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The same point also appeared in Myers, though its true signifi-
cance was obscured. “The President is a representative of the
people,” Taft wrote, “just as the members of the Senate and of the
House are, and it may be at some times, on some subjects ... [that
he] is rather more representative of them all than are the members
of either body of the Legislature, whose constituencies are local and
not countrywide.”516 Because the President was elected “with the
mandate of the people,”517 the power of the President to remove was
essential to “the plan of government devised by the framers of the
Constitution.”518 Taft was wrong about the Framers—their plan of
government did not include a political presidency—but right that
presidential removal is, after the Twelfth Amendment, one impor-
tant way of implementing the people’s authority over their govern-
ment. 
The argument I have advanced here is structural: in sum, the
political character of the presidency and its policy-making authority
in relation to Congress make presidential administration a political
undertaking, and the President requires the power of removal to
vindicate this structurally conferred political role.519 Moreover,
removal power in the hands of a democratic and representative
President is an important means by which “We the People” exercise
control over the government.520 There remains the question of
precisely which executive officials the President needs to have
power to remove. The argument from political structure suggests
the class extends to those officials with significant policy-making
authority—cabinet heads, principal deputies, and heads of agencies,
at least. I turn now to briefly trace how this model might work in
practice.
2. Cases and Controversies
My intention in this Section is to offer a brief overview of how the
political structure argument might play out in four of the Supreme
Court’s seminal removal cases: Myers v. United States, Humphrey’s
516. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 123 (1926). 
517. Id. at 123. 
518. Id. at 127. 
519. See supra notes 495-506 and accompanying text.
520. See supra notes 506-10, 513-19 and accompanying text.
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Executor v. United States, Bowsher v. Synar, and Morrison v. Olson.
In at least one case it suggests a different result; in others it would
work a change in the reasoning. I will not attempt to analyze the
cases in detail, but only to suggest how the structural argument
might affect their resolution. 
a. Myers v. United States
Chief Justice Taft, writing for the Court, concluded that the
President enjoyed exclusive constitutional authority to remove
executive officers of the United States, and that an 1876 act of
Congress requiring Senate approval for removal of postmasters was
unconstitutional.521 Taft’s voluminous opinion relied heavily on the
constitutional judgment he believed the First Congress had reached
in the Decision of 1789.522 Myers also credited Congress’s acquies-
cence to presidential removal for three-quarters of a century (until
the Tenure of Office Act of 1867), and the executive branch’s
consistent claims that the President possessed removal authority.523
In addition, Myers held, if somewhat obliquely,524 that “executive
power” inherently included the removal power, both by virtue of
historical practice—“[i]n the British system, the Crown, which was
the executive, had the power of appointment and removal”525—and
because without the power to remove, the President could not take
care that the laws be faithfully executed.526
The argument from political structure suggests the Myers
conclusion is right, but the reasoning is in need of revision. To the
extent Taft’s opinion held that the Decision of 1789 represented an
authoritative judgment by the First Congress on the removal
question, it was likely mistaken.527 And even if the claim were
521. Myers, 272 U.S. at 163-64, 176-77. 
522. Id. at 136. 
523. See id. at 136, 174-75. 
524. See id. at 136 (“We have devoted much space to this discussion and decision of the
question of the Presidential power of removal in the First Congress ... because of our
agreement with the reasons upon which it was avowedly based.”). 
525. Id. at 118. 
526. Id. at 122 (“[W]hen the grant of the executive power is enforced by the express man-
date to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, it emphasizes the necessity for
including within the executive power as conferred the exclusive power of removal.”). 
527. See supra notes 491-94 and accompanying text.
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historically accurate, it is not clear from an originalist perspective
why the views of a body of individuals other than the drafters and
ratifiers should count as constitutionally authoritative, nor why the
acquiescence of subsequent Presidents and Congresses should settle
the question—unless of course these actors’ views actually com-
ported with the original meaning.528 If they did not comport with the
original meaning, they would be irrelevant. Alternatively, if they
were only one plausible interpretation of a fundamentally ambigu-
ous meaning, they would be not legal interpretations but political
constructions, which the judiciary should neither invalidate nor
endorse.529 Myers’s reference to English Crown practice was
similarly flawed: it is far from clear that the Constitution takes the
monarch’s prerogatives as a baseline.530 
When the opinion turns to the President’s need to control the
administration, Myers moves to firmer ground.531 The structural
argument would set this point in its proper context. Because the
Constitution’s structure makes the President a political actor, Myers
should have held that his administration of the laws is a political
undertaking in the broadest sense. As the people’s representative,
the President has the right to exercise independent policy judgment
in his execution of the law and to administer the government
according to his political principles. He cannot realize these rights
without exercising control over policy-making subordinates. As to
whether the Portland postmaster at issue in Myers counts as a
policy-making official, it is sufficient to note that in 1926, the time
the case was decided, regional postmasters were important political
appointees with significant administrative responsibilities.532 
This revised reasoning captures Myers’s most promising insights
about the President’s need for political control of his administration
and the office’s representative character, while grounding those
insights firmly in constitutional structure.
528. See Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, supra note 469, at
2029. 
529. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 154-55 (1999). 
530. See supra notes 487-89 and accompanying text. 
531. See Myers, 272 U.S. at 122. 
532. See C. Herman Pritchett, The Postmaster General and Departmental Management, 6
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 130, 133-35 (1946) (describing the responsibilities of the Postmaster
General around the time of the Myers decision).
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b. Humphrey’s Executor
In Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, decided just nine years
after Myers, the Supreme Court reversed course and held that
Congress may limit the President’s removal authority over members
of independent agencies and other government officials who are not
“purely executive.”533 The question in the case was whether the
Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC”) founding statute, the Federal
Trade Commission Act, prevented the President from removing FTC
commissioners for any reason other than “inefficiency, neglect of
duty, or malfeasance.”534 The Court famously reasoned that the
Commission was “a body of experts”535 created by Congress to “carry
into effect legislative policies embodied in the statute,”536 that it was
“to be non-partisan”537 and was obliged to “act with entire impartial-
ity,”538 and therefore could not be an executive agency.539 Instead,
the Court declared the Commission to be “quasi-judicial and quasi-
legislative.”540
The Court’s refusal to locate the Commission squarely in any one
branch of government has been justly criticized.541 The Court’s claim
that the Commission’s expert and nonpartisan character entitled it
to insulation from executive control is equally problematic. The
structural argument would produce a different outcome. The
Commission, as the Court admitted, administered “legislative
policies”;542 more precisely, it conducted investigations, made
reports, and generally enforced the government’s antitrust law.543
These duties made the Commission a policy-making agency, and
constitutional structure therefore instructs that its members must
533. 295 U.S. 602, 627-28, 631-32 (1935). 
534. Id. at 619. 
535. Id. at 625. 
536. Id. at 628. 
537. Id. at 624.
538. Id. 
539. Id. 
540. Id.
541. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitutional Principle of Separation of Powers,
1991 SUP. CT. REV. 225, 234 (analyzing the doctrinal approaches to separation of powers and
critiquing the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in that area). 
542. Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 628. 
543. Id. 
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be subject to presidential control.544 This same logic applies to all
executive branch agencies, whether designated “independent” or
not: If the agency implements policy, the President is entitled to
control it through the removal power.545 The only executive agencies
to which this conclusion would not apply are those that conduct
largely judicial functions and are therefore not, strictly speaking,
policy-making entities.546 
c. Bowsher v. Synar
Bowsher v. Synar raised the question of whether Congress could
invest the Comptroller General with final authority over the federal
budget and simultaneously reserve for itself the power to remove
the office’s occupant.547 The Court answered in the negative based
on the constitutional separation of powers doctrine, which it said
prevented Congress from seizing the task of law administration.548
Stated in this form and at this level of abstraction, the Bowsher
judgment comes dangerously close to relying on a separation of
powers meta-norm not anchored to any particular text.549 Justice
White dissented based in part on this ground.550 
The structural argument developed here supplies an alternative
ground for the decision—namely, that the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
Act attempted to prevent presidential removal of the Comptroller.551
The Court’s findings as to the executive, policy-making nature of the
Comptroller’s authority were more than enough to sustain the
conclusion that the President must be able to direct the Comptroller
in order to maintain control of the executive branch.552 The Court
found that the Comptroller General wielded “the ultimate authority
544. See supra Part IV.B.1.
545. See supra Part IV.B.1.
546. The Court reached the same conclusion in Myers. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S.
52, 135 (1926). Lessig and Sunstein also reach a similar conclusion, although on different
grounds. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 167, at 22-32. 
547. 478 U.S. 714, 717 (1986). 
548. Id. at 726. 
549. See Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, supra note 469, at
1961. 
550. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 760 (White, J., dissenting). 
551. The statute permitted removal only by congressional resolution, and only for cause.
See id. at 717, 728. 
552.  Id. at 733.
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to determine the budget cuts to be made. Indeed, the Comptroller
General commands the President himself to carry out, without the
slightest variation ... the directive of the Comptroller General as to
the budget reductions.”553 Structure tells us that an officer with this
authority must come under the direction of the President. On this
reasoning, Congress may well have been entitled to retain power to
remove the Comptroller for cause—the office was arguably an agent
of Congress housed in the legislative branch554—so long as it did not
deny the President’s power to remove the Comptroller at will. 
d. Morrison v. Olson
Finally we come to Morrison v. Olson, the Court’s most recent re-
moval case and one of its most controversial.555 Morrison concerned
the Watergate-era Ethics in Government Act, which permitted the
Attorney General to seek the appointment of an independent coun-
sel to investigate alleged misfeasance by high executive branch
officials, including the President.556 Appointment of the independent
counsel was vested in a special three-judge subpanel of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.557 Removal was entrusted to
the Attorney General alone and only for cause.558 A seven-member
majority of the Court concluded, over the lone dissent of Justice
Scalia,559 that the Act was constitutional in these particulars
because the independent counsel did not interfere with “the
functioning of the Executive Branch.”560 For his part, Justice Scalia
contended that prosecution of crimes was the quintessential
executive power and was uniformly regarded as such at the time of
the founding.561 Scalia also argued that any derogation of the
President’s power to remove executive branch officials would
553. Id. 
554. Id. at 737 (Stevens, J., concurring).
555. 487 U.S. 654, 685 (1988). 
556. Id. at 660-61. 
557. Id. at 661 n.3. 
558. Id. at 686. 
559. Justice Kennedy did not participate.
560. 487 U.S. at 658, 691-93. 
561. Id. at 697, 733-34 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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undermine the principle of separated powers, because “all of the
executive power” belongs to the President.562 
Structural reasoning based on the Twelfth Amendment suggests
the Court’s conclusion was likely correct, though not for the reasons
it offered. Consider the Court’s logic. The majority rightly acknowl-
edged that “the functions performed by the independent counsel are
‘executive’ in the sense that they are law enforcement functions that
typically have been undertaken by officials within the Executive
Branch.”563 The Court concluded that this fact did not settle the
matter, however. The majority was right about this because, con-
trary to the claims of Justice Scalia,564 it does not appear that
criminal prosecution has always been regarded as part and parcel
of the executive power. Recent scholarship has cast doubt on Scalia’s
assertion that the Framers never separated prosecution from
presidential control—the earliest U.S. attorneys, for instance, were
not under the direct control of the President.565 This being the case,
Scalia’s argument that to deny the President removal authority over
a federal prosecutor is to divide the executive power566 only begs the
question.
According to the majority, the pertinent query was whether the
President’s lack of removal control “unduly interfere[ed] with the
role of the Executive Branch.”567 The Court apparently derived this
test from Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, which held
that a statute violates the Vesting Clause if it “disrupts the proper
balance between the coordinate branches ... [by] prevent[ing] the
Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned
functions.”568
The Court was half right. To the extent the Morrison test
valorizes interbranch balance as the sum and substance of the
562. Id. at 705 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
563. Id. at 691. 
564. Id. at 732-33 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
565. See, e.g., Harold J. Krent, Executive Control over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some
Lessons from History, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 290-303 (1989); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note
167, at 15-16. But see Saikrishna Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521,
563 (2005).
566. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 732-33 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
567. Id. at 693. 
568. 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) (emphasis added). For a perceptive analysis of the Morrison
decision, see Lee S. Liberman, Morrison v. Olson: A Formalist Perspective on Why the Court
Was Wrong, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 313, 327-28 (1989). 
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Constitution’s separated powers,569 it turns down a blind alley. This
sort of functionalism pays far too little attention to the divisions
between the branches explicitly written in the Constitution and
gives far too little credence to the Constitution’s command that
these divisions remain permanent.570 Nevertheless, the Court was
onto something when it looked to the effect that the removal-
insulated independent counsel might have on the President’s
capacity to execute his assigned constitutional role. As we have
seen, structural reasoning tells us that the President’s constitu-
tional role is political in the broadest sense and that the President
thus requires political control of the executive branch.571 The
question the Court should have asked, therefore, is whether pre-
venting presidential removal of the independent counsel interfered
with the President’s ability to control his branch politically—that is,
his ability to direct policy and conform law administration to his
political principles. The Court should have asked this question not
because the Constitution commands merely functional balance
between the branches, but because the Vesting Clause, interpreted
in light of constitutional structure, gives the President political
control of the administration.572 
An effects test is necessary in Morrison to vindicate the Presi-
dent’s political control of the executive branch, because it is not
immediately apparent whether the independent counsel counts as
policymaker in the relevant sense. If the independent counsel could
be easily classed as a policy-making authority, like the Comptroller
General in Bowsher, no inquiry as to effects would be necessary.
And of course were Justice Scalia correct that criminal prosecution
569. This is the approach, more or less, famously advocated by Peter Strauss. See Peter L.
Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions—A Foolish
Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 493-94 (1987); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies
in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 575-77
(1984). This functionalist approach was long advocated on the Supreme Court by Justice
White, among others. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 759-60 (1986) (White, J.,
dissenting); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 967 (1983) (White, J., dissenting). 
570. See, e.g., Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, supra note 469,
at 1979-80; see also Merrill, supra note 541, at 251. See generally M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond
Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 604-05 (2001)
(critiquing contemporary conceptualizations of separation of powers law and advocating a new
interpretation).
571. See supra Part IV.B.1.
572. See supra Part IV.B.1.
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had always been regarded as an inherent aspect of the executive
power,573 an effects test would be similarly beside the point: the
meaning of executive power would not be ambiguous, at least to this
case.574 But in the end, neither the policy-making status of the
independent counsel nor the connection between executive power
and prosecutorial control is clear. Consequently, the effect of the
independent counsel on the President’s capacity to exert political
control of the executive branch should decide the case.
C. Other Applications
1. The Treaty Power
The Twelfth Amendment bears on other questions of executive
power. For example, it helps explain the Supreme Court’s frequently
repeated but never adequately justified holding that the President
has sole authority to conduct treaty negotiations apart from Senate
oversight and its related holding that the President may enter into
treaty-like executive agreements with no Senate approval at all.575 
The touchstone for this line of cases is the Court’s famous, and
famously confused, Depression-era decision, United States v.
Curtiss-Wright. In 1934, Congress delegated to President Franklin
Roosevelt the authority to prohibit the sale of arms to certain
nations in South America.576 The Court held that this authorization
did not constitute an illegal delegation of law-making power because
the delegation merely vindicated, rather than augmented, the
President’s independent power over foreign affairs.577 “It is impor-
tant to bear in mind that we are here dealing not alone with an
authority vested in the President by an exertion of legislative
power,” the Court wrote in what is perhaps the decision’s key
573. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 732-33 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
574. John Manning disputes even this point. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary
Interpretation, supra note 469, at 1966 n.147 (“Even if prosecution is a quintessentially
executive function, that conclusion does not preclude all congressional regulation of the way
that function is implemented.”). 
575. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 688 (1981); United States v. Pink,
315 U.S. 203, 229-30 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330-31 (1937); United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318-29 (1936). 
576. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 311-12. 
577. Id. at 321-22. 
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passage, “but with such an authority plus the very delicate, plenary
and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal
government in the field of international relations.”578 Elaborating on
the point, the Court explained that in the “vast external realm” of
foreign affairs, “with its important, complicated, delicate and
manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or
listen as a representative of the nation.”579
From this premise the Court inferred that the President must
have the power to negotiate treaties on his own initiative, without
senatorial oversight.580 For one thing, the President, “not Congress,
has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail
in foreign countries,” because he enjoyed access to “confidential
sources of information” simply not available to the Senate.581 But
the critical point was the President’s status as “the sole organ of the
nation in its external relations.”582 Given that station, the power to
negotiate with foreign powers was the President’s by right.583 Thus,
the Court concluded, “[i]nto the field of negotiation the Senate
cannot intrude.”584
The Court used the same logic to infer presidential authority to
negotiate binding executive agreements without Senate approval.
In United States v. Belmont, the Court ruled that agreements
reached between the Roosevelt Administration and the Soviet Union
in 1933 as part of the Administration’s diplomatic recognition of the
Soviet government empowered federal authorities to recover assets
from American companies on the Soviet Union’s behalf, even though
the agreements had never been ratified by, or even submitted to, the
Senate.585 The Court characterized these executive agreements as
incidental to the power of diplomatic recognition.586 And in the move
that decided the case, the Court cast the authority to recognize
578. Id. at 319-20. 
579. Id. at 319. 
580. Id. at 319-21.
581. Id. at 320. 
582. Id. at 319 (internal quotations omitted). 
583. Id.
584. Id. (emphasis added). 
585. 301 U.S. 324, 330-31 (1937). 
586. Id. at 330 (“The recognition, establishment of diplomatic relations, the assignment,
and agreements with respect thereto, were all parts of one transaction, resulting in an
international compact between the two governments.”).
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foreign nations as an exclusively presidential prerogative.587
Recapitulating the reasoning of Curtiss-Wright, the Court in
Belmont held that “[g]overnmental power over external affairs is not
distributed, but is vested exclusively in the national government.
And in respect of what was done here, the Executive had authority
to speak as the sole organ of that government.”588 The Court
broadened this logic five years later in United States v. Pink,
holding that the President’s power to negotiate executive agree-
ments stemmed not only from his right to confer diplomatic
recognition but also from his authority “to determine the public
policy of the United States with respect to” foreign nations, a right
that was his to exercise “without consent of the Senate.”589
As a sheer matter of Article II text and history, these conclusions
are hardly obvious. Article II, Section 2 grants the President the
power, “by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make
Treaties,”590 but says nothing to suggest that the Senate’s participa-
tion should be confined to a ratifying vote taken only after the
substantive work of treaty making has finished. And Article II does
not so much as contemplate executive agreements.591 Tellingly, at
the Constitutional Convention it was the Senate, not the President,
that held the treaty power until the Committee of Detail proposed
to divide the treaty authority between the two branches in the
Convention’s closing month.592 Even then, many, and perhaps most,
delegates anticipated that the Senate would remain the more
important and active partner in treaty negotiations.593
How, then, to make sense of the Court’s conclusions? One might
look to early executive practice, as courts have often done and as
Akhil Amar has recently advocated.594 But that interpretive
strategy, if it can truly be called interpretive, is no more persuasive
587. Id.
588. Id. 
589. 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942); see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453. U.S. 654, 682-83
(1981). 
590. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
591. U.S. CONST. art. II.
592. RAKOVE, supra note 38, at 264-65; 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, supra note 5, at 493-95. 
593. RAKOVE, supra note 38, at 266; 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
supra note 5, at 540-41, 547-50. 
594. AMAR, supra note 2, at 309-19.
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in this context than on the removal question. And the Court’s own
attempted explanation in Curtiss-Wright is infamously
convoluted.595 That opinion claimed that the foreign affairs power
belonged indivisibly to the President because the power originated
not with the States, but rather was an incident of sovereignty,
passing “from the Crown ... to the colonies in their collective and
corporate capacity” as a result “of the separation from Great
Britain.”596 This view of sovereignty has been roundly criticized, but
in any event it only begs the question; even if the foreign affairs
power was one that by its nature inhered only and ever in the
national government, why should the Executive be the sole branch
and the President the sole officer capable of its exercise? The Court’s
better answer has nothing to do with sovereignty, and everything to
do with the political representation that follows from the Twelfth
Amendment. 
At one point in its opinion, the Court in Curtiss-Wright comments
that the President is “a representative of the nation.”597 It is a
tantalizing reference. In context, the language is largely rhetorical
flourish, offered to embellish the Court’s repeatedly stated and
thoroughly conclusory point that the President is the nation’s “sole
organ” in foreign affairs.598 But the Twelfth Amendment suggests
that this reference to representation may supply a deeper logic for
the Court’s conclusions. The President is indeed, after the Twelfth
Amendment, the nation’s representative. He is connected to popular
majorities, and thanks to that connection, authorized to act on
behalf of the people. Ultimately, the post-Twelfth Amendment
President possesses political authority, which is what the Court was
gesturing toward, without ever quite grasping, in Curtiss-Wright. 
The Constitution makes the President the head of state, as well
as “Commander in Chief.”599 Join those constitutional designations
with political authority, and the President acquires a strong claim
to act as a policymaker in the realm of foreign affairs. That the
President is the one and only head of state strongly suggests that a
politically empowered Executive should be the principal
595. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316-20 (1936).
596. Id. at 316. 
597. Id. at 319. 
598. Id. at 319-20. 
599. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
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policymaker in foreign matters and that he is uniquely empowered
to, in the words of United States v. Pink, “determine the public
policy of the United States” concerning foreign nations.600 Once the
President is understood in this light—as the nation’s political
representative—the rest of the Court’s inferences seem far more
plausible. If head of state status joined to political authority conveys
the power to set the nation’s foreign policy, then the authority to
make treaties is surely an important implement for carrying that
foreign policy-making power into effect. To force the President to
submit to Senate oversight of treaty-making, to deny him initiative
and discretion, would severely hamper his ability to “determine the
public policy of the United States”601 concerning foreign nations in
a way that submitting a finalized treaty for ratification would not.
Similarly, if the President is, by virtue of being the people’s demo-
cratically chosen head of state, the sole representative of the nation
to the outside world, then the power to recognize foreign govern-
ments would seem to be a uniquely presidential power. The ability
to conclude bilateral agreements with other governments or to reach
agreements that further America’s international public policy
follows naturally enough. The President’s political status supplies
the missing link in the Court’s treaty-making cases. And that status
is a product of the Twelfth Amendment. 
2. Directive Authority over Administrative Agencies 
To take a brief, final example, structural reasoning based on the
Twelfth Amendment might also have something to say about the
President’s directive authority over administrative agencies. The
Supreme Court’s decisions in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States and Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan suggested that
delegation of rule-making authority directly to the President vio-
lates the Constitution’s separated powers,602 while the Court’s
subsequent decisions indicate that such delegations to administra-
tive agencies, however broad, do not.603 From these decisions,
many scholars have concluded that presidential direction of
600. 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942). 
601. Id.
602. 295 U.S. 495 (1935); 293 U.S. 388, 431-33 (1935). 
603. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 486 (2001). 
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administrative rule-making is unconstitutional, or at least, highly
problematic.604 The structural argument developed here suggests
otherwise. If those agencies are within the executive branch605 and
engaged in policy making, presidential direction of their activity
violates no constitutional norm because the President is constitu-
tionally entitled to control the political, policy-making activity of the
Executive. Or so one might argue. Whether Congress may delegate
administrative authority to particular executive branch officers and
prevent the President from controlling their decisions, except by
removal, is a separate question, though the structural argument
may well have something to say on that point also.606 
CONCLUSION
The American presidency was perhaps the Philadelphia Framers’
most original composition. My argument here has been that the
Twelfth Amendment fundamentally transformed that office and
restructured the constitutional order in the process. I have argued
that these structural changes have interpretive consequences. By
altering the character of the presidency and its relationship to
Congress, the Twelfth Amendment changed the meaning of
executive power. After the Amendment, administration of the laws
became a political task and the President a political actor. This
shift, at once constitutional and political, casts new light on the
removal debate, on the treaty-making power, and potentially on a
series of other executive power questions. Ultimately, my argument
is just this: one cannot understand the constitutional presidency
and its powers without reckoning with the Twelfth Amendment. 
604. For a discussion, see Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV.
2245, 2319-31 (2001). 
605. And every entity or agency in the government must reside within one branch. See
Merrill, supra note 541, at 231. 
606. Chief Justice Taft acknowledged this possibility in Myers and deemed it constit-
utionally permissible. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 161 (1926). 
